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ARTICLE
CHECK PLEASE: USING LEGAL LIABILITY TO
INFORM FOOD SAFETY REGULATION
Alexia Brunet Marks*
ABSTRACT
Food safety is a hotly debated issue. While food nourishes,
sustains, and enriches our lives, it can also kill us. At any given
meal, our menu comes from a dozen different sources. Without
proper incentives to encourage food safety, microbial pathogens
can, and do enter the food source-so much so that according to
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), each year
roughly one in six Americans (or forty-eight million people) gets
sick, 128,000 are hospitalized, and 3,000 die of foodborne
diseases. What is the optimal way to prevent unsafe foods from
entering the marketplace?
Safety in the food system emerges from a delicate interplay
of several sources-direct regulation, legal liability, and market
response. And yet food safety is a largely unexplored area in legal
scholarship. This Article fills this void by examining the
contribution of legal liability first as an economic signal to deter
firms from producing unsafe food and then as an indirect
regulator promoting food safety. Two parts follow.
Part I examines the efficacy of legal liability to deter firms
from producing unsafe food. I estimate an empirical model using
all (320) publicly recorded foodborne illness settlements and
verdicts in the U.S. from 2000-2011, to determine factors that
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. J.D.,
Northwestern University; Ph.D., Purdue University. For their thoughtful comments on
earlier drafts, I thank Victor Fleischer, Ming Chen, Harry Surden, and Donna Byrne as
well as workshop participants at the Midwestern Law and Economics Annual Meeting,
the Rocky Mountain Junior Scholars Workshop, and the University of Colorado Summer
Workshop on Food Law and Policy.
723
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
influence the plaintiff win rate, resolution time, and plaintiff
recovery.
Statistically significant results include: Plaintiffs who sue
for foodborne illness injuries win more often and win more
monetary damages when they settle. Cases are resolved faster
and damages are higher when the plaintiffs attorney is ranked
and an expert in the field. Interestingly, in states where
punitive damage limits are in place, plaintiffs resolve their
cases faster, they are more likely to win, and they collect more
damages in general. When the plaintiff suffers the gravest
injury (death), the case takes longer to resolve and damages
are higher. Plaintiffs also win more damages when the injury
takes place in a state that has an efficient public health
reporting system.
The results suggest that as a cost of doing business,
foodborne illness litigation sends a strong signal to firms to
increase food safety practices-but only when cases settle and
not necessarily when they reach a jury trial. The way in which
the results highlight the existence of market failures in
providing food safety-the transaction costs and the
information costs preventing plaintiffs from suing in the first
place and from recovering fully-presents valuable
information for regulators.
Part IL contributes to the understanding and active debate
surrounding the interplay between legal liability and food
safety regulation, suggesting the optimal way for these two
deterrence mechanisms to interact. My solution is for
regulation to be responsive to foodborne illness litigation. This
Article advocates for empirically informed regulation and
contributes to the literature of tort law, law and economics,
and food safety. The new Food Safety Modernization Act
(FSMA), promulgated by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), has the potential to aid plaintiffs in
overcoming causation and traceability concerns with their
claims. Concrete recommendations seek to inform an audience
of regulators currently drafting the final rules.
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I. INTRODUCTION: FOOD SAFETY FROM FARM TO FORK
Ensuring the safety of the increasing volume and diversity
of food is an enormous challenge. Visit any grocery and you
will find fruits and vegetables available at any point in the
year, products sourced from all over the globe, and more and
more food available on demand. From the farm to the fork, the
food on your plate at any given meal has touched the hands of
perhaps a dozen different shippers, regulators, and foreign
ports of entry. Add to this the involvement of farmers,
producers, distributors, restaurants, etc., and this leads to
roughly fourteen million individuals plus four million
additional jobs in related industries, together producing 20% of
the U.S. gross national product.' These facts and others
highlight the complexity of the U.S. food chain.
Regulating the safety of our food supply is as complex as the
sourcing and delivery of food itself. After a product enters the
stream of commerce, it is not a simple task to map which agency
1. See CTR. FOR FooD SAFETY & APPLuED NuTRION, 2009 STATE OF




oversees its transshipment. The following paragraphs provide a
glimpse into the regulatory framework in place.
Food safety laws exist at the federal, state, and local levels.
At the federal level, food is regulated by twelve federal agencies
in which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) take leading roles. The
FDA regulates all domestic and imported food while the USDA
regulates meat, poultry, and frozen, dried, and liquid eggs; the
U.S. Department of the Treasury regulates the labeling of
alcoholic beverages above 7% alcohol and tobacco; and the EPA
regulates pesticide residues in foods and requirements for
drinking water.
Given the number of federal agencies sharing regulatory
authority over food, the focus of this paper is on the FDA, a
science-based regulatory agency within the Department of
Health and Human Services. We focus on the FDA because many
rules governing the new FDA regulations under the Food Safety
Modernization Act (FSMA), which replaces the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), are still being drafted and have not been
finalized-making it an opportune time to make policy
recommendations. In addition, one cannot overlook the vast scope
of FDA regulatory authority and the overwhelming number of
products that the FDA regulates. For example, the FDA houses
seven product-oriented centers and offices, its most active center
being the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN).
Setting the regulation of food aside for a moment, the FDA is
responsible for the safety of the nation's domestically produced
and imported cosmetics, drugs, biologics, medical devices, and
radiological products.' This means that one quarter of every
consumer dollar is spent on food, dietary supplements, and
cosmetics regulated by the FDA.' Of the quarter, "approximately
75 percent is spent on foods."' CFSAN regulation occurs at the
federal and state levels.6
CFSAN regulates $466 billion in food-$417 billion worth of
domestic food and $49 billion worth of imported foods (and over
2. Id.
3. Id. at 7.
4. See id. at 7-8 ("CFSAN, in conjunction with the nationwide field force of the
Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA) is responsible for the safety, nutrition and proper
labeling of foods and cosmetics.").
5. Id. at 8.
6. See id. (observing that state level authorities receive "guidance, model codes,
and other technical assistance from CFSAN").
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$60 billion worth of cosmetics).' In one form or another,
regulation takes place at the port of entry, the manufacturing
site, and the retail outlet.! When it comes to regulating food at
the port of entry and manufacturing levels, CFSAN regulates
over 377,000 registered food facilities-154,000 registered
domestic and 223,000 registered foreign facilities "that
manufacture, process, pack, or hold food consumed by humans or
animals in the U.S." (in addition to several thousand cosmetic
firms).' When it comes to retail outlets--"restaurants,
institutional food service establishments, or supermarkets,
grocery stores, and other food outlets"-CFSAN takes a
secondary role providing "guidance, model codes, and other
technical assistance" to state, local, and tribal authorities.o
These CFSAN activities provide some regulation of food at the
state, local, and tribal levels; however, more directly, most states
have a health and safety act which can apply criminal,
regulatory, and administrative sanctions on manufacturers that
sell adulterated or contaminated food.
And while food safety laws are in place and the U.S. boasts
that it provides residents with the safest food in the world, the
food supply in the U.S. is by no means "perfectly" safe."
Regulations, which are intended to provide the proper incentives
to prevent foodborne illness outbreaks, are not foolproof. "[The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)] estimates
that each year roughly 1 in 6 Americans (or 48 million people)
gets sick, 128,000 are hospitalized, and 3,000 die of foodborne
diseases."" This Article addresses two questions. With new FDA
regulations currently in the drafting phase, what regulatory
improvements are necessary to make food safer for consumers?
Are there other deterrence mechanisms at play and if so, what
can direct regulators, such as the FDA, learn from other, indirect
forms of regulation in place-such as legal liability (foodborne
illness lawsuits) and market forces (loss of reputation, stock price
effects, etc.)?
Anecdotal evidence shows that regulators can benefit from





11. Jennifer Ackerman, Food: How Safe?, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC MAG., May 2002, at 2,
9, 30.
12. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC ESTIMATES OF




other indirect forms of regulation such as legal liability and
market mechanisms." For instance, in a perfectly competitive
market, firms receive negative signals about their errors and the
market corrects itself. In the context of food safety, for firms to
alter corporate behavior to invest in food safety, manufacturers
must face costs when they violate rules. (They must also be
assured that they can reap the benefits of new innovation.) What
are some of the negative signals (costs) that firms receive in
order to modify their food safety practices? The costs are
regulatory, market-oriented, and legal in nature.
Take for example the famous E. coli foodborne illness
outbreak implicating Odwalla Inc. unpasteurized apple juice in
1996." The outbreak resulted in the death of one child and
seventy injuries and ultimately led Odwalla, the producer, to
discontinue the sale of unpasteurized juice." It also resulted in
substantial monetary losses for Odwalla: a voluntary product
recall (valued at $12.5 million), a 17% drop in revenue during the
first six months after the outbreak, a record $1.5 million federal
fine for interstate shipment of an adulterated food product (the
largest fine ever assessed in a food case by the FDA), and twenty-
one personal injury lawsuits."6
This example shows how direct regulation by the FDA
combines with legal liability and market mechanisms to curtail
firms from placing unsafe food in the marketplace. And yet, as
CDC estimates reveal, foodborne illness outbreaks continue to
occur, and gaps in food safety persist. What lessons can
regulators learn from the Odwalla incident and others to fine-
tune the balance of deterrence mechanisms that are at play? In
the end, Odwalla received several different signals (regulatory,
legal, and market) and the firm implemented positive food safety
13. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Product
Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARv. L. REV. 1919,
1941 (2010) ("[TIhe risk of being exposed for lax or incompetent regulation by subsequent
products liability litigation at times serves as an incentive for appropriate regulatory
diligence.").
14. Pam Belluck, Juice-Poisoning Case Brings Guilty Plea and a Huge Fine, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 1998, at A12; see also Editorial, Rotten Fruit, Black Crud and the End of
Odwalla, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, available at http://community.
seattletimes.nwsource.comlarchiveldate=19980116&slug=2728990.
15. Belluck, supra note 14.
16. Jean C. Buzby et al., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRIG. EcoN. REP. No. 799,
PRODUCT LIABILITY & MICROBIAL FOODBORNE ILLNESS 8 (2001), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer-agricultural-economic-report/aer799.aspx; see
also Belluck, supra note 14 (noting that the $1.5 million fine was the largest food safety
fine assessed by the FDA).
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changes." In many cases, however, firms and private markets do
not receive adequate signals and fail to provide adequate food
safety because market failures are present (such as the presence
of information costs) or because detection is often difficult and
the nature of contamination is complex." Regulators can learn
from instances when different signals (regulatory, legal, and
market) succeed and fail.
This Article examines the contribution of legal liability first
as an economic signal to deter firms from producing unsafe food
and then as an indirect regulator to regulate food safety
alongside the FDA. Pure economic theory suggests that legal
verdicts deter future conduct." Intuitively, based on the Odwalla
outbreak, it appears that lawsuits do more than compensate
consumers for economic losses from foodborne illnesses-they
provide a potentially powerful economic signal to firms to invest
more in food safety. Yet as a deterrence mechanism, legal
liability can only go so far.
While one may hear that an outbreak of foodborne illness
was followed by a recordbreaking verdict for the plaintiff, this is
not the norm. Not every plaintiff makes it to trial. Market
failures exist in that not all victims sue (lawsuits are long and
expensive, and transaction costs are prohibitive), information (on
traceability) is limited, and plaintiffs have to overcome causation.
Some plaintiffs have cases resolved in confidential proceedings
prior to filing; some have cases resolved through arbitration prior
to trial and after filing."
In this way, high transaction costs and information costs
may lead to less than desirable levels of food safety. Only when
firms expect to bear the costs of injuries (as foodborne illness
litigation-related costs) will they invest more resources in
reducing contamination; at the same time, of course, firms need
to be able to reap the benefits of investing."
17. Belluck, supra note 14 (describing how Odwalla adopted stricter safety
standards after sustaining losses in sales, fines, and civil liability).
18. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 1932; see also Helen H. Jensen,
Food-System Risk Analysis and HACCP, in NEW APPROACHES TO FOOD-SAFETY
EcoNOMICS 63 (G.J. Velthius et al. eds. 2003).
19. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33
(1972) (discussing how tort liability encourages producers to utilize safety precautions to
avoid accidents by weighing the costs and benefits).
20. In many cases, these settlements may be lower than their initial demands.
Settlements do not always transparently affect a firm's bottom line because there is no
market mechanism as in the report of a jury verdict. See Robert J. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage,
60 FLA. L. REV. 125, 129-30 (2008).
21. See Denis W. Stearns, On (Cr)edibility: Why Food in the United States May
Never Be Safe, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 245, 252-53 (2010) (claiming that firms do not
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This Article argues for empirically informed regulation-
regulation that incorporates empirical findings about legal
outcomes such as trials and settlements. The emprical study
reported in this Article uses 320 publicly reported personal injury
lawsuits involving domestically manufactured food from 2000-
2011 using the Westlaw database.2 2 Confidential settlements are
not included." I specify three models to analyze factors that
influence: (1) the speed at which a case is resolved (the "speed"
model); (2) whether or not a plaintiff wins (the "win" model); and
(3) how much she wins (the "award" model), all while controlling
for state differences in public health administration and tort
reform legislation.
All of the results in this section are statistically significant,
with the degree of significance reported in the Appendix. The
results suggest that firms may be better deterred by cases that
make it to arbitration or settlement, versus cases that go to trial.
While most cases in the database reach the verdict stage,
plaintiffs win more often and win more monetary damages when
they settle. Next, cases are resolved faster and damages are
higher when the plaintiffs attorney is ranked and an expert in
the field. Punitive damages play an interesting role-in states
where punitive damage limits are in place, plaintiffs resolve their
cases faster, they are more likely to win, and they collect more
damages in general. When the plaintiff suffers the gravest injury
(death), the case takes longer to resolve and damages are higher.
Plaintiffs also collect more when the injury takes place in a state
that has an efficient public health reporting system.
The results suggest that foodborne illness litigation sends a
moderate signal to firms to increase food safety practices-but
mostly through settlements. The data suggest that publicly
have incentives to invest in safety measures unless they face a risk of harming "a
sufficiently large number of people"); see also Elise Golan et al., Savoy Buyers Spur Food
Safety Innovation in Meat Processing, USDA ECON. RES. SERV., AMBER WAvES (Apr.
2004), http://webarchives.cdlib.org/swlvh5dg3r/http://ers.usda.gov/Amberwaves/AprilO4/
Features/SavvyBuyers.htm.
22. Several sources of data were consulted in determining whether firms can be
held legally accountable for outbreaks of foodborne illness. There is no national system
documenting products liability cases. We used the Westlaw Personal Injury Jury Verdicts
and Settlements Summaries (JV-PI). Within this database, we searched for
verdicts/settlements involving personal injuries due to pathogen-contaminated food
between 2000 and 2011. We reported cases that produced symptoms consistent with
foodborne illness (gastrointestinal distress), that were linked to food, that claimed to have
resulted from pathogens in food. Additional searches also contained searches for certain
foodborne illnesses. The JV-PI database is available at http://www.westlaw.com.
23. If deterrence is not working optimally through reported cases, it may be
working through confidential settlements, a study for future research.
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reported settlements send stronger economic signals to deter
firms from producing unsafe food. The results also highlight the
market failures that exist in food safety-the transaction costs
and information costs preventing plaintiffs from suing and
recovering fully-providing in and of itself valuable information
for federal regulators. Plaintiffs win when they are able to hire
reputable attorneys-and those attorneys usually take cases
when plaintiffs are able to identify the pathogen, controlling for
age and type of defendant.
My solution is that regulation should be empirically
informed and responsive to the foodborne illness litigation-as it
provides a glimpse into publicly available foodborne illness cases.
With rapidly changing food consumption patterns, globalization,
food delivery chains becoming more complex, and foodborne
illnesses becoming more common,24 this is the time to consider
whether the pending FDA rules consider litigation outcomes. For
example, regulations could benefit from several findings. The
FSMA can potentially correct market failures in the delivery of
safe food. We know that plaintiffs face high transaction costs and
information costs in bringing cases forward. FDA regulations can
aid plaintiffs in overcoming the main hurdles in their case-
causation and traceability-by focusing resources on prevention
(increasing inspections particularly at restuarants and
increasing sanctions for importers) and response (coordinating
efforts between federal and state public health reporting).
Increasing the fines for violations is also recommended. The
results can aid regulators as they draft the final rules in the
legislation.
This Article is timely. Strikingly, food safety is a largely
unexplored area in legal scholarship-in the areas of tort, food
safety regulation, and the economics of litigation. As the literature
review section of this paper will reveal, one reason tort scholarship
and related discussions in law and economics have not focused on
food safety is due to the lack of available data in this field-not only
are food safety cases settled confidentially and therefore
unavailable, but even those that are publicly available are
commingled in larger categories of products liability or personal
injury. This work fills many gaps in existing literatures.
To advance the argument, the Article proceeds in four parts.
Part I describes the literature in the areas of tort and food safety
24. Stearns, supra note 21, at 256-62 (discussing how consumers cannot efficiently
distinguish between safe and unsafe food products because of modem food markets, and
discussing a recent increase in the percentage of U.S. poultry containing Salmonella).
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regulation. Part II addresses foodborne illness litigation in
practice. Part III examines foodborne illness litigation through
an empirical examination of the cases. Part IV outlines my
solution, followed by concluding remarks.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Strikingly, food safety is an unexplored area in legal
scholarship. One novelty of this Article is that it combines two
strands in the literature-tort law and food safety regulation. I
will first present how my research builds upon and informs
existing tort literature.
Can tort law or food safety regulation impact firm behavior
in a socially desirable way by providing correct signals and
adequate incentives to "deter" harmful conduct? In the
paragraphs that follow, many theories are advanced to suggest
that tort law has the ability to deter future wrongdoing given the
right penalty structure (a combination of compensatory and
punitive damages). Trial outcomes have higher deterrence value
than public settlements-but this may not be the case when
confidential settlements are concerned. For all of these scenarios,
the prohibitively high costs that deter plaintiffs from bringing
cases forward erode any deterrence value that legal liabilty has.
Current food safety regulation has many shortcomings which
hinder it from deterring firms' future wrongdoing. Each of these
theories will be reviewed in full.
A. The Deterrent Effect of Tort Law
Tort liability is designed to shift the costs from the victims to
the offenders and signal the potential wrongdoers to implement
precautionary measures. From an economics perspective, the
socially optimal goal of tort law is to draft laws that induce an
injurer to take the appropriate level of care-care that minimizes
the sum of the cost of taking care and losses incurred by
victims. 2 5 The tort system can work as a deterrent if benefits from
taking the socially appropriate level of care and making
investments to reduce risk and external costs from harmful
activities are internalized." However, it should be noted that a
25. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of
Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability, 17 J. LEGAL STuD. 151, 154-56 (1988)
(examining the most efficient level of care that minimizes costs to both manufacturers
and victims).
26. Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, The Economics of Tort Law: A
Prdcis, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO LAW & ECONOMICS 88 (Jurgen G. Backhaus ed., 2d
732 [50:3
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market failure exists in that plaintiffs do not always sue due to
high information and transaction costs involved in litigation.
When litigation costs are taken into account, only victims whose
losses exceed their cost of litigation will sue." If a plaintiff does
not sue because he perceives the costs of litigation to be great,
the injurer may have an incentive to take less care because he
will not have to pay for all of the losses he causes; if, however, a
plaintiff sues because he perceives the losses to exceed the cost of
litigation, the injurer may take more care "because, by reducing
the harm suffered by victimis], he can reduce the number who
sue."28
Describing the chronology of a legal dispute becomes
instructive. A legal dispute occurs in stages which define the
initial harm through the assertion of a legal claim, settlement
bargaining, and trial. The party that allegedly suffered a harm
decides whether or not to assert a legal claim. A rational person
makes this decision by solving what Cooter and Rubinfeld term
"a sequential game," or a set of decisions made in a sequence,
each decision balancing the immediate cost of hiring a lawyer
and filing the claim against future benefits such as receiving
proceeds from settlement or victory at trial."
In this way, tort law forces potential injurers or "tortfeasors"
to take account of the accident costs they impose on others. In an
ideal world, individuals who are engaged in risky activities will
take efficient precautions by increasing their level of care (for
example, a driver will drive slower) but only to the point that the
ed. 2005); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Product Safety Legislation and the Law of Torts, in
PRODUCT LIABLITY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT
151, 152-54 (Janet R. Hunziker & Trevor 0. Jones eds., 1994), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309051304/html/151.html.
27. See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46
U. MIAMI L. REV. 111, 122 (1991) ("If the anticipated damage award exceeds the cost of
litigating, plaintiffs will have incentive to bring suit.").
28. See Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 25, at 151. Polinksy and Rubinfeld note
that "the. . . problem now becomes one of minimizing the sum of the cost of care, the
losses of the victims, and the cost of litigation. With these changes, it may no longer be
desirable to set the level of liability equal to the victim's lossles]." Id. at 151-52. The
authors show that "strict liability with compensatory damages generally" leads to a
socially inappropriate level of care and to excessive litigation costs. Id. at 152. The
optimal adjustment to compensatory damages, which may be positive or negative, takes
into account the effects of liability on the injurer's decision to take care, and on the
victims' decisions to sue. Id.
29. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal
Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1084 (1989) (noting that
when contingent fees are applicable, evidence shows that these fees can allow clients to
signal the qualities of their cases and attorneys to signal the quality of their advice); see
also Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Suzanne Scotchmer, Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An
Economic Analysis, 24 RAND J. EcoN. 343, 345-48, 354 (1993).
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anticipated benefit from the additional precaution (the
anticipated benefit in our example may be safely passing a
bicyclist) is not outweighed by its cost. (In our example, the cost
of slowing down does not mean purchasing a new steering system
for instance, i.e., the cost of it is not prohibitive.)"0 In its purest
form, the economic formula traditionally applied to explain this
theory was elaborated by Judge Learned Hand, as to how the
burden of taking precautions (B), the probability of harm (P), and
the gravity of harm (L) interact.1 When potential tortfeasors take
"optimal precautions," they minimize the costs they impose on
society, as calculated by the sum of the expected accident costs
(P*L) added to the resources provided for precautions (B); in
other words, (P*L) + B."
Before a trial even begins, the plaintiff files a claim, the
defendant responds to that claim, and both the parties attend
preliminary hearings with the judge, engage in pretrial
discovery, and set trial dates." With each of these pretrial steps,
the judge tries to encourage the parties to bargain and settle the
case out of court." If parties cooperate and reach a bargain,
parties have settled; failure to cooperate and reach a bargain
results in an "adversarial trial." While the amount that the
plaintiff expects to win is determined by the quality of the case, it
is also determined to a great extent by the effort (or lack of effort)
that each party expends at each stage of litigation.36
A legal dispute is resolved efficiently when legal
entitlements are allocated to the parties who value them the
30. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1096 (2000)
("Traditional law and economics suggests that precaution is efficient when its benefits
outweigh its costs. .. ."); Jeff Kerr, Comment, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker: The Perils of
Judicial Punitive Damages Reform, 59 EMORY L.J. 727, 738 (2010).
31. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
32. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 214 n.2 (8th ed. 2011).
33. Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 29, at 1069.
34. Id. There are many rules and procedures governing litigation to increase the
probability of settlement; for example, FED. R. Civ, P. 16(c)(2)(I). The rule also gives the
court discretion to "direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to
appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes
as .. . facilitating the settlement of the case." FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5). And in the advisory
committee's note to Rule 16, the Committee further points out that settlement should be
facilitated early on since it eases crowded court dockets and results in savings to the
litigants and the judicial system. FED. R. CIv. P. 16 advisory committee's notes on 1983
Amendments. Similarly, Rule 68 imposes legal costs on parties who reject a settlement
offer that later proves to be more favorable to them than the trial outcome. FED R. CIv. P.
68.






most-legal liabilities are allocated to the parties who can bear
them at the lowest cost, and the transaction costs of dispute
resolution are minimized. When parties to a dispute cannot
resolve their differences by private bargaining, and when
negotiations fail, the courts dictate a resolution in the last stage
of a legal dispute. The outcome of the trial (win for plaintiff or
defendant), is the result of a complex interaction between the
efforts that both parties invest into the trial and the underlying
facts and the law of the case.
There is evidence that the imposition of civil liability has
great deterrent effects." For one, the American institutional
setting assigns significant political power to the legal system
whereby in many cases the authority to regulate safety reverts
back to the courts." As a result, society is left with legal liability
as a deterrence and compensatory mechanism." And yet there
are instances when a defendant loses at trial and does not take
necessary precautionary measures.
The level of damages determines the quantity of
precautionary measures that are implemented by the losing
defendant. For some cases, excessive damages have to be
assessed before a defendant will implement precautionary
measures. When legal liability is assessed, plaintiffs receive
compensatory damages and, when available, punitive damages.o
Punitive damages are assessed to punish the wrongdoer and may
be necessary to assure that adequate precautionary measures are
taken, or, as Seventh Circuit Court Judge Richard Posner
argues, to correct less-than-socially-ideal verdicts." Food safety
may fall into this subset of cases when considering the
37. See Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and
Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 62-65 (1990) (explaining how imposing "sizable punitive
damages awards" serves to deter harmful conduct by manufacturers). For a contrasting
view, see James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has
Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1158-64 (1984), which argues that punitive
damages have a "minimum" or "unlikely" deterrent effect.
38. See Janice Kemp, The Continuing Appeal of Punitive Damages: An Analysis of
Constitutional and Other Challenges to Punitive Damages, Post-Haslip and Moriel, 26
TEx. TEcH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1995) (discussing the existence and extent of courts' authority to
assess punitive damages); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 26, at 152-54 (noting that courts
serve an important role in the regulation of product safety).
39. "Ultimately all that is regulatory is legal in a democratic society." Nesve A.
Turan Brewster & Peter D. Goldsmith, Legal Systems, Institutional Environment, and
Food Safety, 36 AGRIC. EcoN. 23, 24 n.1 (2007). We restrict the notion of "regulatory" to
those specific actions by government bureaucracies to increase the supply of safety.
Alternatively, legal forces operate through the court system and market forces operate
through the marketplace.
40. Id. at 28.
41. See POSNER, supra note 32, at 262.
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description Posner provides. If the harm is difficult to detect or
does not manifest until long after the harm occurs, this will lead
to a divergence between private and social costs if the harm
producer is thus able to escape liability sometimes, Posner
argues." In this type of scenario, if the potential tortfeasor does
not equate the amount he spends on precautions with a reduction
in the probability of paying damages, the potential tortfeasor will
not spend the socially optimal amount on precautions." As a
result, the level of care that is optimal for the tortfeasor and the
level of care that is optimal for society are not aligned." In this
scenario, as Posner notes, punitive damages would not only be
helpful, but they would also be "necessary" to realign costs for
each." While a distributional problem still remains in that some
injured would get much more compensation than they need, and
others would go uncompensated," the publicity of the lawsuits in
place could help to alleviate this distributional effect by raising
the probability of detection. Once this has occurred, the amount
of punitive damages should be decreased accordingly.
Even while planitiff victories may have a deterrent effect,
there is evidence first within medical malpractice law and second
within tort law itself that legal liability may not be an effective
deterrent. A reading of some medical malpractice cases
illustrates how a plaintiff verdict may lead to an adverse result.
For medical malpractice cases, evidence shows that the tort
system may not be able to provide incentives to ensure an
optimal level of safety. There is evidence that when doctors
began to lose verdicts, defensive medicine (when phycisians' fear
of medical liability leads them to use precationary treatments
with minimal expected medical benefit) developed.4 7 Analogize
this to food safety: if food manufacturers were to begin using
precautionary measures to avoid liability, would they avoid
traceability investments to avoid traceability?8
42. See Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that awards of
compensatory damages for "elusive or intangible" harms are "likely to fall short" of
compensating plaintiffs' injuries).
43. See id. at 35 (arguing that a tortfeasor will generally be "underdeterred" from
committing concealable tortious acts).
44. See id. at 34 (noting that it is socially undesirable when the benefits from a
tortfeasor's tortious activity outweigh the expected costs).
45. See id. ("Punitive damages are necessary. . . to make sure that tortious conduct
is not underdeterred, as it might be if compensatory damages fell short of the actual
injury inflicted by the tort.").
46. See POSNER, supra note 32, at 244.
47. Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111
Q.J. ECON. 353, 354, 385-88 (1996).
48. See Brewster & Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 35.
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Strikingly, a reading of tort cases suggests that tort law is
not an effective deterrent. Consider the following: in August
1997, "frozen ground beef patties produced at the Hudson Foods,
Columbus, Nebraska plant were discovered tainted with E. coli
0157:H7"; soon thereafter, Hudson announced a series of recalls
that reached "25 million pounds, the largest meat recall in the
U.S."' After long and protracted litigation, a U.S. district court
judge dismissed the charges against two former employees who
were indicted under criminal charges by a federal jury for not
being truthful about the source of the contamination and
conspiring to falsify information during the USDA's
investigation. 0
If the courts are reluctant or unable to impose harsh
penalties on the basis of punishing the innocent and violating the
American constitutional setting with protected fundamental
rights, acquittals of defendants can lead to incentive distortions
and low safety.
In sum, there appears to be more evidence finding that tort
law is ineffective at deterring firm behavior than evidence in its
favor.
1. Trials and (Publicly Reported) Settlements. Despite
evidence showing that tort law in general does not appear to be a
good deterrent, whether a case is settled or litigated may have a
different deterrent effect. The underlying difference is that there
is a cost difference between settlement and trial. The law and
economics literature addresses issues surrounding the selection
of cases that are settled versus those that are brought to trial;"
however, few articles have examined the deterrence value of
settlements versus verdicts."
Given that settlements outnumber trial verdicts, one may
conclude that settlement is the "preferred" alternative to going to
trial." Even efforts to promote settlement, including the Civil
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. The early literature includes: William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the
Courts, 14 J.L. & EcON. 61 (1971); John Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); William Baxter, The Political
Economy of Antitrust, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST: PRINCIPAL PAPER BY
WILLIAM BAXTER 3, 3-49 (Robert D. Tollison ed., 1980); Steven Shavell, The Social Versus
Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 333-39
(1982).
52. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1381 (1994).
53. Id. at 1339.
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Justice Reform Act's requirement that courts adopt techniques
for expediting the litigation process, suggest that settlement is
the preferred outcome."
To be sure, it is generally taken for granted that it is better
for cases to settle out of court than to go to trial because the cost
of settling a case is less than the cost of taking it to trial. (After
all, settlements are clearly superior to trials if one's goal is to
minimize transaction costs.) This begs the question: do
settlements undermine or weaken the deterrent effect of legal
norms? Further, does the fact that a settlement may be
"confidential" affect the answer to the foregoing question?
Interestingly, the literature supports the view that trials
and settlements have different deterrent effects-that is,
whether a dispute goes to trial or is settled in and of itself
results in different actions taken by the defendant regarding
behavior that gave rise to the dispute.5 The reason is that the
defendant's payout from a settlement will be less than the
defendant's payout from a verdict. For instance, for an out-of-
court settlement to be possible, the injurer must expect to lose
more from litigating than the amount the victim believes he
can recover from litigating. If the parties can agree on an
amount that is within this settlement range, the amount will
make both parties better off than the expected trial outcome
(because at trial, one party will lose and one party will win)."
If a potential injurer expects that a case will settle (meaning
that he perceives he will lose more money from litigating than
settling) then the result will be a settlement and the injurer
will pay less (than going to trial) and will ultimately not take
as much care as he would otherwise. To the extent that the
verdict amount may have been the socially desirable amount,
the settlement may not be the socially desirable outcome." In
this way, "[tirials would lead to even greater care since the
injurer's expected payment would be higher."" These effects
54. Id.
55. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent Effects of
Settlements and Trials, 8 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 109, 112 (1988) (arguing that once
deterrence is taken into account, trials may be superior despite their higher
transaction costs).
56. Id. at 109-10.
57. Id. at 109, 112.
58. Id.
59. Id.; see also Philip J. Hermann, Predicting Verdicts in Personal Injury Cases,
475 INS. L.J. 505, 506 (1962) (noting that in a national study of 443 verdicts in cases
involving back and neck injuries found that only one in six of the offers and demands were
within 25% of the actual verdict).
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"must be taken into account in any system designed to induce
injurers to take socially appropriate care.""o
If settlements deter less than trial outcomes, there is
certainly a range within each category. Some settlements have
little to no value in deterring future behavior while some
settlements may have deterrence value. In a 1993 study by Marc
Galanter and Mia Cahill, the authors argue that not every
settlement promotes the best outcome." The authors argue that a
mix of legal, sociological, and economic factors contributes to a
party's decision to settle and that these factors contribute to the
benefits of settlement." Further, the authors argue that there is
such a thing as a "good" settlement and a "bad" settlement and
that not all settlements are alike."
If trial outcomes have more deterrence value (presumably
because they result in higher monetary payouts), it would be
helpful to know not only which cases go to trial, but also which
cases win. George Priest and Benjamin Klein advanced a
selection hypothesis to explain the selection of cases for trial from
the underlying population of filed cases, based on the position of
the legal standard, the degree of stake asymmetry, and the
prediction of trial outcomes." Their model concerns what cases go
60. See Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 55, at 110, 114. Polinksy and Rubinfeld
provide examples. Id. at 110-14. Assume an individual who suffers harm sues the injurer.
For an out-of-court settlement to be possible, the victim's expected gain from
going to trial must be less than the injurers expected loss from trial.. .. Thus, to
the extent that a potential injurer anticipates that cases will settle, he will
expect to pay less and will not take as much care as he would otherwise....
[However], suppose the settlement amount exceeds the victim's harm (not
including his litigation costs). Then, if all cases settle [at this amount], an
injurer will pay more than the harm he causes and will take socially excessive
care.
Id. at 109.
So settlements that are generally undesirable (because they lower the level of care) are
valuable if they exceed the victim's harm. Id. Now, consider another case where
settlements will be valuable. "[Sluppose the settlement amount is less than the victim's
harm. Then, if all cases settle [at this amount,] an injurer will not pay for all of the harm
he causes and will take socially inadequate care." Id. (emphasis added). But these cases
will generally go to trial. The "expectation of going to trial" makes the injurer's expected
payment higher and makes this outcome socially desirable. Id. In sum, "a necessary
condition for trials to be socially valuable is that" when every individual who is harmed
brings a suit, the settlement amount ought to have been less than each victim's loss. Id. at
112. And, for trials to be socially optimal, the benefit associated with increased deterrence
based on trials must exceed added litigation costs. Id.
61. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 52, at 1388.
62. Id. at 1350-51.
63. Id. at 1346-50.
64. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6-30, 55 (1984).
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to trial and what cases win." They assert, "[flor the rate of
plaintiff verdicts to be an accurate measure of the influence of a
legal standard of judicial or jury attitudes, or of the substantive
fairness of any adjudicatory process, litigated disputes must be
representative of the entire class of underlying disputes."
However, there is a relationship between disputes that are
settled and disputes that are litigated. In a study examining the
determinants of settlement and litigation, Priest and Klein
predict that factors tend to be purely economic, such as
information that each party possesses about the likelihood of
success at trial, as well as the expected costs to parties of
litigation and settlement generally, and favorable or adverse
outcomes." Along the stages of litigation, litigants estimate their
likelihood of success based on many factors including "legal
precedent or judicial or jury bias."' The authors conclude that in
contrast to common perception, cases that are litigated (as
opposed to being settled) are neither random nor representative
of all disputes; moreover, plaintiff victories will approach 50%
regardless of many factors-whether the legal standard is
negligence or strict liability or whether judges or juries are
hostile or sympathetic."
In other words, cases go to trial in which defendants and
plaintiffs have a 50% probability of winning.o Importantly, when
the core assumption-that plaintiff and defendant stakes in the
outcome differ-is relaxed, the rate of success in litigation will
differ from the 50% baseline."
65. Id. at 6-7, 55.
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 4-5.
70. Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
185, 186 (1985); see also Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the
Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 313, 334 (1988) (demonstrating through equations how, as each party's
chance of winning at trial approaches 50%, the rate at which cases go to trial increases).
Wittman notes that the Priest-Klein rule is biased when the parties disagree about the
expected trial award. Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, supra, at 190-
93; see also Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 29, at 1074.
Disagreement concerns in part the meaning of "winning," which is ambiguous in
the context of trials. The plaintiff "wins" a civil suit, in one sense of the word, if
the court awards damages or provides injunctive relief. Many civil suits,
however, concern not the fact of the defendant's liability but its extent. From
this perspective, the plaintiff "wins" at trial only if the damage award is larger
than the defendant's settlement offer.
Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 29, at 1074-75.
71. Priest & Klein, supra note 64, at 20.
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Stakes are most clearly symmetrical where the parties seek
solely a dollar judgment in a dispute over activities in which
neither party ever expects to engage again." If, on the other
hand, one of the parties expects to continue the specific activity
leading to the dispute, the judgment in the current case will
affect future behavior and thus extend beyond the dollar amount
alone."
Applying the Priest and Klein findings to this Article,
foodborne illness cases present an example where stakes will
differ. The empirical results will show that foodborne illness
cases typically feature a single consumer suing a manufacturer
(or restaurant or wholesaler) whose future practices will be
affected by the outcome." According to Joel Waldfogel, stakes are
higher for defendants in tort cases." Evidence of this can be
found in products liability cases, a subset of tort cases generally.
Priest and Klein's empirical evidence, drawn from the Cook
County Illinois Jury Verdict Reporter for contested civil cases
tried to juries by case type from 1959 to 1979, shows that for
products liabiltiy cases, defendant verdicts exceeded plaintiff
verdicts-plaintiff verdicts were found in 42.8% of 477 cases."
72. Id. at 24-25.
73. See id.; see also Cooter & Rubenfield, supra note 29, at 1074 (noting that
typically the probability of winning will increase for the party with a future interest in the
victory, citing a Nash game in economics as an example).
74. See Priest & Klein, supra note 64, at 24-25.
75. Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship Between Trial
and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. POL. EcON. 229, 253 (1995). Waldfogel examined cases
involving contracts, property rights, and torts and found "that litigated cases are
unrepresentative of filed cases, that plaintiffs have higher stakes in contract and property
rights cases" and stakes are higher for defendants in tort cases. Id. at 253, 256.
Specifically, he found in a sample of federal civil cases from the Southern District of New
York, "less than a third of tort cases filed go to trial, and of those that do, the plaintiff
wins about a third of the time." Id. at 238, 242, 244.
76. See Priest & Klein, supra note 64, at 41 tbl.2, 42 (noting that "[dluring the
twenty-one year period ... , the standard of liability for defective products changed ...
from negligence to strict liability, a standard adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in
1965"). But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILTY LAW 43 (1980)
(asserting that new liability might have little incentive effect on manufacturers' behavior
regarding existing long-lived products). When cases are divided at the date that the strict
liability standard became effective, and regressions are run on these respective datasets,
"the proportion of plaintiff recoveries in product liability actions under a negligence
standard, 1959-65, is 39 percent; under the strict liability standard for the same time
period it is 43.4 percent. This slight increase in the recovery rate is not statistically
significant." Priest & Klein, supra note 64, at 42. The results of these regressions are
important for our study in that for our analysis of foodborne illness product liability cases
our cases come from different states where changes in the standard may have taken
place. If the change in standard took place, an increase in the rate of recovery under strict
liability could be ascribed to the lessening of the plaintiffs legal burden. Id. at 42. If the
plaintiff had less to bring forward, defendants should win more often. Priest and Klein
also note that
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This finding is consistent with their theoretical prediction that if
one looks at litigated cases only, defendant verdicts will exceed
50% when the stakes are greater for the defendant."
There are many reasons for which the stakes for defendants
may be higher than those for plaintiffs. An adverse judgment for
a defendant restaurant, for example, may influence subsequent
sales volume when fewer patrons decide to frequent the
establishment.' Similarly, one adverse judgment against a
restaurant, for example, may lead other similarly injured parties
to sue, thereby increasing the plaintiffs' likelihood of success and
settlement demands, placing pressure on the defendant." "[Ilt is
often alleged that firms that deal over time with a substantial
number of claimants invest to establish and preserve a
reputation for tough bargaining to reduce further settlement
demands.""0
Then again, money is not everything. The dollar judgment
sought by the plaintiff may reflect only a small portion of the
defendant's total loss if the plaintiff wins." In these disputes,
"the stakes almost surely will differ between the parties."82
Clearly when defendants may lose more from an adverse verdict
than a plaintiff stands to gain, the calculus that drives litigation
and settlement decisions will change. Generally, defendants are
willing to offer more when they face a greater chance of losing
and are willing to offer less when they face a greater chance of
winning." As a result, more disputes with likely plaintiff verdicts
will be settled and relatively more disputes with likely defendant
verdicts will be litigated.' If we observe only litigated cases,
defendant verdicts will exceed 50%." The fifty percent rule
breaks down, Cooter and Rubenfeld argue, when a defendant
[ain alterantive hypothesis consistent with the data is that the shift [in the
standard] made little difference in terms of outcomes, either because juries had
themselves adopted a strict liability attitude toward product liabiltiy defendants
before the change in legal standard, or because a strict liabiltiy standard cannot
be distinguished from a negligence standard (for example, in design defect cases)
because of the requirement of demonstrating the "defect" or because of the
survival of affirmative defenses.
Id. at 43 n.82.
77. Priest & Klein, supra note 64, at 26.




82. Id. at 28.





who wants to avoid the publicity of trial will settle cases that he
has a high probability of winning." Applying this to foodborne
illness cases, when defendants fear the publicity of trial, they will
likely settle despite the favorable odds of a defendant victory at
trial.
2. Confidential Settlements. Evidence suggests that
confidential settlements differ from publicly reported
settlements. "Where information about the existence or terms of
a settlement is prevented from public circulation, as by the
typical agreement that the terms of settlement are confidential,
the general deterrence effects are presumably weakened." Why
is this so? One reason may be because this information does not
circulate or cause the firm disrepute. In contrast, these awards
may have a deterrent effect if one considers the size of the
awards compared to verdicts and settlements. Evidence supports
that while plaintiffs receive less in damages when they settle a
case instead of taking it to a verdict, confidential settlements
may result in higher awards for plaintiffs because of the
importance to large corporate defendants in terms of maintaining
reputation and limiting themselves from further liability." These
contrasting assertions necessitate further consideration.
The traditional economic model of settlement is based on the
premise that the settlement value will be equal to the parties'
expected value to be achieved at trial, i.e., EV = p * L (expected
value = the probability of a plaintiffs verdict * the monetary
amount of such a verdict)." According to this model, "[tihe
defendant will offer any amount less than the EV of the claim
plus its litigation costs; the plaintiff is willing to accept any
amount more than EV minus its own litigation costs."" Under
this model, it appears that the amount that a claimant would
receive in settlement would be lower than that received from a
jury verdict." It is due to things such as divergent estimates of p
86. Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 29, at 1074-75.
87. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 52, at 1382.
88. Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 867, 878-89 (2007).
89. Id. at 874 (citing Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value
of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1273 (2006)).
90. Id. at 874 (emphasis added).
91. See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 89, at 1272-73 (2006) ("The effects of risk or
uncertainty are again expressed through changes in the relevant discount rate, with




and L (or "mutual optimism") that cases do not settle.92 Once
confidentiality is brought into play, settlement ranges expand
because of the value which defendants place on it." Defendants
are more willing to settle because the reputational cost that
comes with a public settlement is no longer present.' Recent
literature suggests that higher-variance-creating variables are
likely to reduce the costs of prosecuting and defending claims and
that variance can increase pressure to settle." If a settlement is
not going to be successful, making a settlement confidential may
increase the amount that the defendant may offer to pay.96
Settling under a confidentiality agreement may result in a
higher award for plaintiffs because of the importance to large
corporate defendants of maintaining reputation and limiting
themselves from further liability. The incentive to keep the
settlement confidential is high when plaintiffs stand to gain
higher verdicts and when defendants stand to preserve their
reputation."
For confidential settlements as well as public settlements,
the issue of variability in trial outcomes and asymmetry of
information both lend pressure to settle. A recent empirical study
of jury trials found that trials often involve "high stakes . .. and
novel legal issues or a unique set facts," which lead to high
uncertainty regarding the outcome."9 For this reason, "they
provide only a vague picture of how an ordinary case might fare
at trial."'o Another study on securities class actions found that
"trial verdicts provide little relevant basis for predicting case
value: 'If similar cases never go to trial, predictions of expected
trial outcomes will have no factual grounding' in verdicts."'o
Settlement occurs when both parties believe the outcome is
better than a result they would achieve at trial.0 2 Therefore,
settlements reflect parties' expectations about the outcome of a
92. See Moss, supra note 88, at 875.
93. Id. at 878.
94. Id.
95. See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 89, at 1325.
96. See Moss, supra note 88, at 879-80.
97. Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement out of the Shadows: Information
About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REv. 663, 675-76 (2001).
98. See id.
99. Id. at 669-70 (reviewing the empirical study by Samuel R. Gross & Kent D.
Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1996)).
100. Id. at 670.
101. Id. at 671 (quoting Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of
Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 567 (1991)).
102. Id. at 668; see also Alexander, supra note 101, at 502-04.
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trial, and verdicts are not that useful of a comparison for
evaluating typical cases.0 3 However, there is conflicting evidence
that verdicts are reliable, predictable, and consistent to indicate
that using information about jury verdicts to predict trial
outcomes is reliable as a reference for evaluating cases."o
B. The Deterrent Effect of Regulation
What are the food safety regulations that are in place to
protect our food channels and how effective are these regulations
in deterring the production of unsafe food? This section outlines
the array of policy tools in place to motivate firms to manufacture
safe food: direct regulation, incentives found in the market,
surveillance that takes place after a product has been placed in
the market, and legal liability."' As noted in the previous section,
the U.S. relies heavily on legal liability, so food safety is not just
a regulatory but also a legal matter.' Previously in Part I, we
103. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2672-74; Fromm
supra note 97, at 668-70. But see PHILLIP J. HERMANN, BETIER, EARLIER SETTLEMENTS
THROUGH ECONOMIC LEVERAGE: VOLUME I LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT ECONOMICS § 3
(1989) (using empirical studies to prove that trial verdicts are a reliable predictor when
evaluating cases).
104. See HERMANN, supra note 103, § 3 (conceding that there are critics of using jury
verdict empirical studies, while still trying to persuade readers of the reliability of jury
verdicts in predicting trial outcomes).
105. Brewster & Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 23 (analyzing the different
mechanisms that drive the safety of the food system and its efficacy within a direct
regulatory approach); Spencer Henson & Julie Caswell, Food Safety Regulation: An
Overview of Contemporary Issues, 24 FOOD POL'Y 589, 593-97 (1999) (discussing the
relationship and interaction between public and private food safety control systems); W.
Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government
Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 79-82
(1989) (analyzing the effects of risk-reduction market incentives and tort liability with
respect to reducing risky activity to society).
106. See Brewster & Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 25 (analyzing the interaction between
the legal system and food safety and explaining that the judicial branch in the United States
has been elevated to be "guardians of the individual rights" and "able to make fundamental
changes in the law especially through judicial review"). Ultimately, all that is regulatory is
legal in a democratic society. See id. at 29 (explaining that the American legal system blurs the
allocation of policy responsibilities, due to the assignment of significant political power to the
legal system which in turn forces regulatory changes). We restrict the notion of "regulatory" to
those specific actions by government bureaucracies to increase the supply of safety. W. KIP
ViscUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 158 (1995)
(explaining that "[tlhe government's responsibility in generating and using risk information
involves structuring a decision process" that is focused on deterring risk). Alternately, legal
forces operate through the court system, and market forces operate through the marketplace.
See Stearns, supra note 21, at 270 (arguing for more accountability in the chain of distribution
in food products to increase food safety, thereby better syncing market actors with legal
liability, implying the disconnect between the legal forces and market forces at work in the food
distribution industry).
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examined how tort liability can deter firms from providing unsafe
food in the marketplace. We begin with a discussion of regulation
generally before turning to the deterrent effect of federal
regulation. Later, in Part IV, we combine the contribution of tort
to direct regulation by the FDA.
Food safety regulations are difficult to make, for they involve
"large scientific uncertainties regarding what is 'safe,' public
perceptions of safety at odds with professional perceptions,
various public values expressed through the political process, and
difficult judgments of equity given that risk and benefit are borne
by different groups.",' As difficult as regulations are to make, are
they necessary?o' Prominent scholars such as Cass Sunstein,
John Braithewaite, Steven Shavell, and A. Mitchell Polinsky
would all argue in favor of regulation as a necessary form of
deterrence."' Shavell and Polinsky go so far as to rank the value of
regulation as a deterrent above the value of legal liability as a
deterrent.10 They state that, in the case of products liability
lawsuits involving domestically manufactured food products, legal
liability is unlikely to serve as a deterrent due to the high
transaction and information costs that deter plaintiffs from bringing
cases forward; moreover, deterrence is possible due simply to market
forces (loss of sales) and regulation."' In contrast, Kip Viscusi would
argue that much of the regulation currently in place is purely an
overreaction to risks that involve low probabilities (for example, the
risk of being in an accident related to a biological attack), that
cannot be supported by conventional cost-benefit analysis."2
107. Chauncey Starr & Chris Whipple, A Perspective on Health and Safety Risk
Analysis, 30 MGMT. SCI. 452, 452 (1984).
108. For a general discussion of regulatory theory and the most often cited
justification for regulation, see STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-34
(1982).
109. CASS SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 28-52
(2002); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 30-34
(2002) (noting, in his discussion on responsive regulation, that regulation should follow a
pyramid approach with increasing punishments based on the severity of the act).
Restorative justice is suitable for a virtuous actor, deterrence for a rational actor, and
incapacitation for an incompetent or irrational actor. Id. The regulator escalates the
pyramid when cooperative or rational approaches fail. Id. Similarly, adequate
enforcement of compliance with private regulation will depend on the attitude of
regulated firms. Id. at 32-33; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for
Product Liability, 123 HARv. L. REV 1437, 1443-454 (2010) (noting that market forces and
regulation are sufficient to form deterrence in products liability cases, but they do not
reference foodborne illness cases as a separate category from products liability cases,
disallowing a presumption that their results hold with respect to foodborne illness cases).
110. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 109, at 1453-59.
111. See id.
112. VISCUSI, supra note 106, at 149-59.
746 [ 50:3
CHECK PLEASE
For argument's sake, assume that regulations contain a
deterrent value. Is food safety regulation any different than
regulation in general? When it comes to food safety, should we
favor strong federal or state regulation of business, or
deregulation altogether? Studies suggest that there is no single
governance mechanism that works. When Ian Ayres and John
Braithwaite state that "regulation occurs in many rooms," they
are stating that regulations arise from many venues."' Others
have supported this proposition arguing that regulation is more
than making rules and includes "rulemaking (standard setting),
monitoring compliance, and enforcement" involving legislatures,
agencies, the court system with involvement from firms, NGOs,
and other non-state actors. An example of this occurs in the meat
industry where food safety comes from an interplay of regulation
and marketing incentives."4 This is all evidence of what Orly
Lobel has termed a "new governance" that "promote[s]
legitimate, effective, and active participation . .. by the private
regulated parties themselves without devolving into
deregulation.""' The replacement of traditional top-down
regulation with more flexible and less state-centered forms of
regulation-including self-regulation, co-regulation,
management-based regulation, private systems of governance,
and empirically informed regulation--challenges existing
conceptualizations of regulation."
113. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 3 (1992).
114. Tetty Havinga, Private Regulation of Food Safety by Supermarkets, 28 LAW &
POL'Y 515, 516 (2006) (citing Sol Picciotto, Introduction: Reconceptualizing Regulation in
the Era of Globalization, 29 J.L. Soc'Y 1, 1-4 (2002) (explaining the modem network
society as having a complex relationship between the public realm and the private
economic sphere)); see also Colin Scott, Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A
Neglected Facet of Contemporary Governance, 29 J.L. Soc'Y 56, 59-66 (2002) (describing
the methods and consequences of private sector regulation on the public sector). For the
interplay of marketing incentives and regulation, see Michael Ollinger & Danna Moore,
The Interplay of Regulation and Marketing Incentives in Providing Food Safety, USDA
EcON. REs. SERV. (July 2009), httpd/webarchives.cdlib.org/swlvh5dg3r/
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err75/.
115. See Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 65 (David Levi-Four ed. 2012); see also Orly Lobel, The
Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004),
116. Havinga, supra note 114, at 515 (citations omitted); see also Darren Sinclair,
Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies, 19 LAW &
POL'Y 529, 533-37 (1997) (highlighting the inadequacies of traditional command and
control policy, as well as a purely voluntary system, and advocating for a multi-
instrument application that can accommodate a wide range of policy variables); Cass R.
Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1387-93, 1397-1410
(2011) (exploring social studies in which empirical findings about human behavior are
incorporated into economic models affecting regulatory policy design and advocating for
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In sum, food safety is regulated by the interplay of three
primary actors: governmental agencies involved in rulemaking,
monitoring, or enforcement; the food industry including farmers;
and third parties such as private auditors, certifiers, retailers,
and consumer organizations." Regulatory approaches can be
empirically informed and range from public to private and from
low-interventionist to highly prescriptive.
1. Inspections, Raids, and Penalties. When it comes to post-
market surveillance mechanisms, what regulatory tools are
available to target breaches in the production of safe food and
how effective are these tools in deterring future wrongdoing? A
distinction is made between direct and indirect regulation (food
laws versus products liability laws)"' and between public and
private food safety standards (food laws versus private
certification schemes)."' The direct regulatory approach is
utilized by U.S. government agencies to specially target breaches
of safety by firms. Meanwhile, the indirect regulatory approach
employs incentives to create an environment leading to reduced
breaches of safety. Also, food safety measures can be
implemented either before a breach or after.
At the federal level, there are domestic inspections of plants,
meat inspection violations 20 and poultry violations,' inspections
on the border, and also administrative remedies.'22 The FDA
appropriate private-public partnerships that allow for better adaptation to the social
environment).
117. Havinga, supra note 114, at 517.
118. See Brewster & Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 24-35 (analyzing the differences
between the British and U.S. regulatory programs and unpacking the theoretical
underpinnings of each country's approach toward regulation, noting their differences
specifically in the use of direct and indirect regulation); see also Havinga, supra note 114,
at 517-21 (discussing private food safety regulation and food safety regulation generally).
119. Henson & Caswell, supra note 105, at 593-97 (discussing the differences
between private and public food safety regulation and describing the efficacy of each
toward the other).
120. Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 676 (2006) (concerning violations of
the Act).
121. Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 461 (2006) (concerning offenses and
punishment); Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1041-1043 (2006) (concerning
enforcement provisions).
122. Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2006).
(1) Any person who violates a provision of section 301 shall be imprisoned for not
more than one year or fined not more than $1,000, or both.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this section, if any person
commits such a violation after a conviction of him under this section has become
final, or commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or mislead, such
person shall be imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not more than
$10,000 or both.
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exercises inspection authority through many regulatory devices,
the most common of which is under section 704 of the FDCA,
whereby the FDA may inspect a facility upon presentation of
credentials and a Form 482 "Notice of Inspection." A
inspection with presentation of credentials and no notice of
inspection is also possible. 12 4 "If a company 'consents' to such an
inspection, it generally forfeits any right it may have otherwise
had to challenge the evidence FDA obtains from the
inspection.""' Finally, the FDA can also exercise inspection
authority by obtaining an administrative inspection warrant
(AIW) from a federal magistrate judge (this is known as a
"regulatory raid").126
While the story behind the Peanut Corporation of America
(PCA) outbreak will be discussed later, a brief introduction to the
case illustrates the use of a regulatory raid noted above. On
January 30, 2009, the FDA's Office of Criminal Investigations
(OCI) began investigating PCA's alleged distribution of
Salmonella-tainted peanut products that reportedly caused
severe illness and even eight deaths across forty-three states. A
week later, the FBI joined the investigation and federal agents
executed search warrants the next day at PCA's Georgia plant
and Virginia headquarters. A reporter noted seeing a set of bolt
cutters, individuals carrying black brief cases, a trailer, vehicles
entering the rear of the plant, and agents exiting the facility with
boxes in hand.'
Despite this example, the FDA rarely resorts to raids and it
rarely resorts to criminal sanctions.' 8 The FDCA provides
misdemeanor and felony charges for cases of "adulterated" food,
which includes selling contaminated food.' Misdemeanors can
result in fines and up to a year in jail."13 This issue came up
recently in the 2011 outbreak involving Jensen Farms
Id. (concerning penalties, violation of section 331, second violations, and intent to defraud
or mislead).
123. John R. Fleder, Search Warrants-What Happens When the FDA Storm Arrives,
UPDATE, May/June 2009, at 46, available at http://www.hpm.com/
pdf/jrfsearchwarrants.pdf.
124. Id. at 47.
125. Id.
126. Id. "FDC Act § 704 is silent on the issuance of AIWs." Id. at 49 n.8; see also 21
U.S.C. § 374(a)(1)(A) (2006).
127. Jim Drinkard, FBI Raids Georgia Plant at Center of Salmonella Scare,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/10/fbi-raids-
georgia-plant-a n_165564.html; Fleder, supra note 123, at 46.
128. Belluck, supra note 14.




Canteloupe in Colorado."' One local newspaper was quoted
saying, "To elevate prosecution to a felony, federal officials would
likely have to find evidence that the Jensens knew that what
they were doing was dangerous, or knew they had contamination
and delivered melons anyway."'3 2
Among the few food poisoning outbreaks that resulted in
criminal conviction was the case against Odwalla (discussed
earlier)."' It seems unlikely that the cantaloupe outbreak will
draw criminal charges, mainly because the FDA has not
imposed criminal charges in twenty years."" Take the example
of the PCA and the 2010 Salmonella outbreak traced to an
Iowa farm."' As noted above, the FDA's OCI executed search
warrants to look into the Georgia plant that distributed
peanuts implicated in the PCA outbreak.'36 PCA had a history
of knowing that what they were doing was dangerous, or
knowing that they had contamination and yet continued to
make deliveries.'"' In the 2010 egg outbreak, no criminal
charges emerged even though the investigation of the Iowa egg
farm traced to the Salmonella outbreak found "decaying mice,
chicken carcasses and flies" in great numbers.'3 8 Congressional
hearings quickly followed the outbreaks and no criminal
prosecutions resulted.'"' Prosecutions on these charges, and
even lighter misdemeanor charges, would signal the
importance of food safety and deter food companies from
adulterating food in the future.
131. See Michael Booth & Jennifer Brown, Criminal Charges Hard to Pin on Farm
Where Listeria-Tainted Cantaloupes Originated, DENVER POST, (Nov. 21, 2011 11:00 AM),
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_19381057 (explaining the difficulty in bringing
criminal charges in a case involving listeria-tainted cantaloupes).
132. Id.
133. Id.; see also Christopher Drew & Pam Belluck, Deadly Bacteria a New Threat to
Fruit and Produce in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 4, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/04/us/deadly-bacteria-a-new-threat-to-fruit-and-produce-
in-us.html?pagewanted=print&src=pm.
134. Booth & Brown, supra note 131.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (noting that PCA "repeatedly shipped products that had already tested
positive for salmonella, sometimes seeking a second lab test to clear the peanuts").
138. Id. (noting that "[tihe farm had received 426 positive results for salmonella
between 2008 and 2010," according to documents obtained).
139. Id. (discussing congressional hearings that have taken place); Ryan J. Foley,
Tony Wasmund, Manager of Egg Farm Behind Outbreak, Pleads Guilty to Bribing USDA
Inspector, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 12, 2012, 2:28 PM) http//www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/09/12/tony-wasmund-bribery-egg-farm-salmonella n_1877784.htmlview=print&




The above examples demonstrate that infrequent use of
raids and criminal sanctions may lead to lapses in food safety.
However, the following shows how broad and aggressive
regulatory responses can backfire. The case involved Supreme
Beef, a meat packing business in Texas that repeatedly failed the
USDA's Salmonella tests for hamburger meat (most of which was
destined for the school lunch program during the Clinton
Administration)." The USDA pulled their inspectors out of the
plant-the result being that Supreme Beef could not sell their
product."' Supreme Beef claimed that the meat they were sent
from the USDA-inspected slaughterhouse was contaminated
before it arrived to its plant (that the USDA breached its own
Salmonella performance standard used in the label "official
USDA Mark of Inspection") and that the USDA was violating
Supreme's right to conduct business. 2 The company fought the
USDA to return its inspectors.
In December 2001, the USDA lost for a final time when the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided to uphold a lower
court ruling that the salmonella performance standard
exceeded the USDA's statutory authority.... [Tihe former
Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman, considered this "a
serious blow" to the USDA's regulatory authority.'
In the above example, Supreme Beef effectively used the
legal system to evade liability and to limit regulatory authority of
government agencies. The government's case faltered when it
was unable to prove the relationship between cause and effect-
that Supreme Beef caused the Salmonella contamination with
certainty.'4 1 This illustrates a key point-it is difficult to establish
cause-effect liability for foodborne illness (thereby making it
hard to achieve convictions). In the end, the court's inability to
protect innocent consumers allowed the company its victory.
Even worse, by setting precedent, this case altered the future
regulatory authority of the USDA.'4 1
Another example that illustrates the limitations of the
regulatory role in managing food safety risk in the U.S. is the
ConAgra case in 2002. The case involved the Greeley Plant, a
140. Brewster & Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 29-30.
141. ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 220 (2001).
142. Brewster & Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 30.
143. Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 275 F.3d 432, 436 (5th Cir.
2001).
144. Brewster & Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 29-30.




meat packing business in Colorado that was suspected of E. coli
contamination of its ground beef."' The product was tested in
early June 2002 and by the end of the month, a formal recall was
in place.' The UDSA was criticized for delays in its notification
process since at the time of the recall, "only 6,000 pounds of the
354,000 of recalled beef was recovered and the rest had been
already consumed." One month later, "the recall was eventually
expanded to 18.6 million pounds of ground beef, the second
largest ground beef recall in the U.S. history.""0
There are many competing interests at play. Given an
environment of new and developing food risks emerging from the
confluence of increased globalization, advanced food chains and
new and emerging pathogens, the standard approaches used by
government regulators have fallen short of what is necessary.'
When regulations fall short, the structure of the food safety
system is such that it "motivate [s] . . . parties to seek legal
solutions.""2 At the same time, rational economic actors cannot
be expected to invest in improving the safety of the food products.
Food producers are self-interested and will act accordingly. As
Adam Smith stated (using the sale of food as an example) "it is
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker,
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self
interest."'3 In other words, food manufacturers, retailers, and
restaurants need to be interested in food safety-they need to be
economically motivated-to provide it. If regulators do not
provide the economic incentives through inspections (and raids),
perhaps litigation will provide the necesssary incentives.
As a final example, consider the case of the PCA Salmonella
outbreak in 2008 and 2009, noted earlier, which according to the
final CDC update resulted in nine deaths and 714 confirmed
Salmonella infections covering forty-six states,14 and the focus of
147. Id.; Elizabeth Becker, 19 Million Pounds of Meat Recalled After 19 Fall Ill, N.Y.
TIMES (July 20, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/20/us/19-million-pounds-of-meat-
recalled-after-19-fall-ill.html.
148. Brewster & Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 30.
149. Id.
150. Id.; Becker, supra note 147.
151. Brewster & Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 30.
152. Id.
153. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 14 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 1937) (1776).
154. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INVESTIGATION UPDATE: OUTBREAK OF
SALMONELLA TYPHIMURIUM INFECTIONS 2008-2009, http/www.cdc.gov/
salmonella/typhimurium/update.html (ast updated Apr. 29, 2009); see also Abbie Boudreau &
Scott Bronstein, Poor Oversight Fueled Salmonella Outbreak, Critics Say, CNN (Feb. 5, 2009,
2:06 AM), httpi/edition.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/02/05/peanut. recall/index.html.
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one of our nation's largest recalls. The facts of the case reveal
that inspections were infrequent and ineffective such that PCA
was free to pursue its self-interest or higher profits. The dirty
conditions at the food production facilities were only revealed as
a result of the outbreak having spurred an investigation. So
much so that an inspector found, "The conditions at the plant,
more circa 1955 than 2009, would have been enough to cause
alarm in an industry where sanitation can be a matter of life and
death."',' Behind PCA's walls hid the array of poor work
conditions and safety flaws, said employees, who lost their jobs
when the plant closed.' As Stearns describes, the only incentive
to "invest in modernizing the plant, in employee training, and in
vigorous internal oversight" was the low probability that the
shocking problems would be exposed."5
In sum, the examples show that the FDA does not make
full use of the tools at its disposal (raids and criminal penalties
as the most severe). And even when it does, defendants are
quick to utilize constitutional protections. Sadly, the examples
presented illustrate how regulations only incentivize
manufacturers to invest in what is necessary to avoid non-
compliance (or getting caught), but no more. Combine this with
a low probability of getting caught and this results in an
incentive to make food less safe."' At a minimum, the
literature on food safety regulation illustrates flaws with food
safety regulation-flaws that could be more informed by an
empirical analysis of litigation outcomes. What do the lawsuits
regarding food safety have to say about regulatory gaps? The
following section examines foodborne illness litigation as an
introduction to the empirical model.
III. FOODBORNE ILLNESS LITIGATION: IN PRACTICE
What is it about foodborne illness lawsuits that makes them
so different from the rest of personal injury, products liability,
and torts cases in general? How does a plaintiff sue for foodborne
illness and who is the defendant?
155. Stearns, supra note 21, at 251; Lyndsey Layton, Peanut Executive Takes the
Fifth, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2009, at A2 (noting that Representative Henry Waxman, a
Democrat from California, stated that PCA's internal records evidenced that it was more
concerned with its bottom line than the safety of its customers).
156. Michael Moss, Peanut Case Shows Holes in Safety Net, N.Y. TiES, Feb 9, 2009,
at Al.
157. Id.




News about an outbreak travels quickly. In order to protect
the lives and safety of others, public health officials do their best
to transmit information regarding an outbreak to the public in a
timely fashion. Before presenting the data on food safety cases, it
is instructive to outline the steps involved in an outbreak, the
decisions that victims and their attorneys make regarding the
collection of evidence and discovery, and the litigation strategies
involved. An understanding of these processes will better prepare
one to understand how litigation can inform the new FDA
regulations and how the FDA regulations can be used to correct
market failures that exist in food safety.
A. When Foodborne Illness Strikes: Incident Reporting
When a consumer becomes ill, she may or may not seek
medical treatment, depending on the severity of the illness or
access to medical care. According to the CDC, because most
consumers do not equate a stomach virus with foodborne illness,
health departments are slow to identify and investigate
foodborne illness outbreaks."o
An attorney is more likely to take the case of a foodborne ill
patient if the victim/plaintiff is able to identify the pathogen (E.
coli and the like) and the food item that was consumed."' In most
cases, this information is only available through laboratory
tests-which means that the plaintiff must have reported the
illness to a doctor or complained to authorities."' There are two
basic routes through which outbreaks are identified-either
through a consumer complaint to a health department or through
a medical report filed at a hospital.'"' According to a recent study
of the state of Minnesota public health system, most reported
outbreaks begin with a consumer filing a complaint to a local
health department.'" If the health department is able to respond
quickly by sending investigators to the field, the consumer
complaint may be the most efficient method of outbreak
detection." In the state of Minnesota, 80% of outbreaks are
160. CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, ALL OVER THE MAP: A 10 YEAR REVIEW OF
STATE OUTBREAK REPORTING 5 (2011), available at http://cspinet.org/new
/pdf/alloverthemap.pdf.
161. See William D. Marler & David W. Babcock, Litigating the Food Poisoning Case:
The Importance of Prior Inspections and Investigations, MARLERCLARK, (2005),
http://www.marlerclark.com/food-poisoning-litigation.pdf





detected through consumer-complaint investigations." An
outbreak can also be detected by a laboratory after a medical
practitioner performs a laboratory test on a patient.1 7 Even in
the case when a patient seeks medical treatment, "a physician
may or may not order appropriate lab tests and even if ordered,
positive results may or may not be forwarded to a public health
agency."""s For instance, a physician is less likely to forward
results to a public health agency if "the detected pathogen is not
one of the reportable pathogens as defined by the state." 9 As
difficult as it may seem to identify a pathogen, identifying the
pathogen is only one step to solving the outbreak. The next step
is for field investigators to interview cases and gather suspect
foods in order to identify the food that caused the outbreak. What
makes matters more difficult is that there is often a "'lag-time'
between onset of illness and notification to the health
department... [This lag time can range] between two days (if a
consumer reports directly to the health department) and roughly
19 days," if reports are received through the laboratory-based
route."' Identifying the food item is complicated by the fact that
"'consumers' memory of what they ate falters; food is consumed
or discarded; and additional persons may become ill from the
same source."171
166. Id. (citing John Li et al., Evaluation of Statewide Foodborne Illness Complain





CDC and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists publish a list of
nationally notifiable infectious conditions, those illnesses thought to be critical
enough to public health to warrant notice to federal public health authorities.
However, reporting of nationally notifiable disease to the CDC by the State is
voluntary. Reporting is currently mandated (i.e., by state legislation/regulation)
only at the state level. The list of diseases that are considered notifiable,
therefore, varies slightly by state. These generally include Salmonella species
(spp.), shinga-toxin producing E. Coli, Shigella, Listeria monocytogenes,
Clyclyspora, Vibrio spp., and Clostridium botulinum.
Id. at 5 n.2.
170. Id. at 6 (citing Li et al., supra note 166, at 2062).
171. Id.; see also Stearns, supra note 21, at 249 & n.12.
[Flor the more common sources of foodborne illness, microbial pathogens, the
incubation period is sufficienty long that, in most cases, more than one food item
or exposure is implicated as a possible infection source. This means that, even
after consuming a given food product and being made ill by it, the consumer has
no reliable means of attributing the illness to the food. It is for this reason,
mainly, that the vast majority of foodborne illness in the United States is, each




Regardless of lag times, investigations may be stalled for
other reasons. Even if the record of the illness reaches the health
department, shortfalls in funding or staffing may prevent the
agnecy from performing the necessary analysis or providing
support to the investigating epidemiologists."' There are
situations where "[elven a culture-confirmed case may or may not
be investigated to determine the food vehicle or exposure data,"
and situations where "[a] state may or may not report the
outbreak to the CDC.""' "Other foodborne illnesses may appear
sporadic as only one or two people become ill in each state.""'
While the state is acting to put a case together, a victim's
medical costs are rising to the point that she may begin to seek
legal representation or be approached by legal representation. An
attorney will examine the evidence and decide whether or not to
take the case. Cases that are confirmed by the CDC are most
promising in terms of plaintiff victory by virtue of more evidence
implicating the defendant.
B. Litigating a Foodborne Illness Claim
Consumer suits over food poisoning have their origin in
strict products liability."' In most jurisdictions a person injured
by a product may base his or her recovery of damages on one or
more theories of recovery: (1) negligence or (2) products liability,
which can be based in negligence, strict liability, or breach of
warranty depending on the jurisdiction."' In a September 2011
case submitted by Marler Clark, a leading foodborne illness law
firm, on behalf of two plaintiffs who suffered from Salmonella
poisoning, five claims were submitted: strict liability, breach of
warranty, negligence and negligence per se, loss of consortium,
and punitive damages."' To illustrate how a foodborne illness
case could be brought in negligence or products liability, consider
the following definitions.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, negligence is
a failure to behave with the level of care that someone of
172. CT. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, supra note 160, at 6.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Marler & Babcock, supra note 161, at 1 & 9 n.1 (citing Hoover v. Peters, 18
Mich. 51 (1869)); Wideman v. Keller, 49 N.E. 210, 210 (I. 1897); Race v. Krum, 118 N.E.
853, 854 (N.Y. 1918); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W. 2d 828, 829 (Tex.
1942).
176. See Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Reconceptualizing the BP Oil Spill
as Parens Patriae Products Liability, 49 Hous. L. REv. 291, 346 (2012).
177. Complaint at 7-11, Byerly v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., No. 2:2011CV04227
(W.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 2011).
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ordinary prudence would have exercised under the same
circumstances. The behavior usually consists of actions, but can
also consist of omissions when there is some duty to act (e.g., a
duty to rescue if one is obligated to do so)."' Proving a prima facie
case of negligence requires establishing physical harm (actual
damages), the existence of a legal duty to exercise reasonable
care (duty), a failure to exercise reasonable care (breach), cause
in fact of physical harm by the negligent conduct (but for
causation), and a showing that the harm is within the scope of
liability (proximate cause)."' When determining whether
reasonable care was taken, one may consider "the foreseeable
likelihood that the person's conduct will result in harm, the
foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden
of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.""'
The Odwalla case provides an example of this. While the
company may not have known that the apples it used to produce
unpasteurized apple juice were contaminated with E. coli, it did
know that it was buying apples gathered from the ground in an
orchard where animals might be present; therefore, one could
argue that it should have known that the apples might be
contaminated.'
A foodborne illness claim may also be brought forward as a
products liability claim. There is no such thing as federal
products liability law.'"' However, many states have either
enacted their own products liability statutes or adopted the U.S.
Department of Commerce Model Uniform Products Liability Act
(MUPLA)."' As noted earlier, in most jurisdictions a person
injured by a product may base his or her recovery of damages on
products liability, which can be based in negligence, strict
liability, or breach of warranty depending on the jurisdiction.
When a products liability lawsuit involves negligence, it can be
brought against the manufacturer, distributor, or designer of the
product that is said to be unsafe.'84 Negligence could be in the
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
179. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 175, 311, 321 (4th ed.
1971).
180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
181. Denis W. Stearns, An Introduction to Product Liability Law, MARLERCLARK
(2001), http://marlerclark.com/pdfs/intro-product-liability-law.pdf.
182. Jean C. Buzby & Paul D. Frenzen, Food Safety and Product Liability, 24 FOOD
POL'Y 637, 639 (1999).
183. Brian Daluiso, "Is the Meat Here Safe?" How Strict Liability for Retailers Can
Lead to Safer Meat, 92 B.U. L. REv. 1081, 1117-18 (2012).
184. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 1001 (2d ed. 2008).
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design or in the manufacturing of the product."' Companies also
have a duty to the consumer to warn them of any dangers that
could come from using their product."'
In states where products liability is considered a strict
liability offense, the level of care by the defendant is not
considered. Strict products liability is liability without fault for
an injury proximately caused by a product that is defective and
not reasonably safe.' In establishing strict liability, the
injured plaintiff need only prove that: (1) the product was
defective; and (2) the product defect was the cause of the
injury."' The level of care taken by the defendant is not
considered-if there is a defect in the product that causes
harm, the defendant will be liable for it. Liability can be
attributed to all parties along a chain of production of any
product for damage caused by the product-which means that
in a case of a contaminated cantaloupe, the plaintiff may be
able to sue the farmer, the distributor, and even the retailer.8 9
In a products liability case, the first threshold is proving that
the product is defective. Products liability can be attributed to
a defect in design, manufacture, or marketing.' In the context
of foodborne illness, design defects occur during the product
creation.'9 ' (For example, a piece of candy was not designed to
dissolve well enough for ingestion by infants.) It is said that in this
case, the design flaw makes the product unreasonably dangerous to
use.'92 Manufacturing defects can be described as defects that occur
during the production such that only a few of a product line of
products of the same type are flawed.' Finally, marketing defects
are also called failure to warn defects in that the manufacturer has
delivered improper instructions or has failed to warn consumers of
latent dangers in the product.'
From a strict liability standpoint, the difficult part of
building a food poisoning case as a "defective product" case is
185. Id. at 60-61.
186. Id. at 63.
187. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998).
188. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal. 1963)
("Plaintiff introduced substantial evidence that his injuries were caused by the defective
design and construction .... The jury could therefore reasonably have concluded that the
manufacturer negligently constructed the [product).").
189. OWEN, supra note 184, at 1001.







the fact that in many circumstances, the implicated food item
has been discarded."" This makes it hard to prove that the food
the plaintiff consumed was contaminated and the source of the
plaintiffs injuries. For instance, since the existance of
Salmonella will make a product "defective" under statutory or
common law definitions, the difficulty arises in proving "that
the food your client consumed was in fact contaminated, and
therefore the source of the client's injuries.""
When a product has been discarded, in order to prove the
manner of contamination in your client's case, it is helpful to
locate any and all evidence of the food service establishment's
prior history involving prior food poisoning incidents, prior
accusations of food contamination, any "prior inspections of the
facility and the establishment's food production and service
procedures[,] . . . documentation of improper food handling
procedures [,] . . . [and any] improper techniques and code
violations."' An attorney can acquire these documents
through discovery or through the use of federal or state
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and can serve to
pressure and position a defendant to an early and favorable
settlement.' If any practices are discovered that are
particularly egregious, such as examples of consistent
improper food handling techniques, this may introduce a case
for punitive damages, in states where such damages are
available.'99
A situation can arise where a disastrous inspection
document is found which "dissuades the defendant from
contesting liability [at triall."2Oo Equally likely, the defense
counsel may be unwilling to admit the document to evidence,
195. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
196. Marler & Babcock, supra note 161.
197. Id. Marler and Babcock note one case regarding a Chinese restaurant in Ohio
implicated in an E. coli 0157:H7 outbreak in 2002. This case was difficult in that no
contaminated leftover food was found and, in addition, "the restaurant was buffet style,
which complicated the identification of a single contaminated food." Id. The investigation
found that many of the ill patrons were children, who may have consumed Jell-O. The
question was: how did the Jell-O become the source of the E. coli outbreak? Luckily, a
health department investigation report provided some insight in that according to the
report, food handling errors had been previously discovered in the restaurant, such as
"raw meat stored above the Jell-O in the refrigerator." Id. The conclusion was that the
"likely source of E. coli [ I in the Jell-O was from raw meat juices dripping on the Jell-O."






making it critical to possess the implicating documents.2 0 ' The
more information the better; procedurally, interrogatories and
requests for production may produce the following: (1) the
"defendant's copies of any inspection reports from government
agencies;" (2) "[dlocumentation of any inspections by third
parties, consultants, or commercial customers;" (3) "[clustomer
complaint logs, incident reports, internal employee input or
suggestion memos;" or (4) "[dlocumentation regarding any
previous food poisoning litigation.""
In addition to the documents listed above, it is also necessary
to collect inspection documents from all local and state regulators
that frequent the establishment.2 os This usually involves identifying
the proper repository of public documents from any local, state,
and/or federal agencies that have jurisdiction over the defendant in
question and then using the appropriate FOIA documents to access
the information.2 04
In addition to claims in negligence or products liability, victims
may allege a breach of warranty of fitness, a claim governed by
contract law. When a company manufactures and distributes a
product they are giving a guarantee or warranty-either express or
implied-that it will not cause harm due to defects.' Products
liability law can also be found in the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), Article 2, adopted by most states to deal with the sale of
goods, the most relevant statutes being the implied and express
warranties of merchantability in the sales of goods, section 2-314
and section 2-315.206
Several defenses can be raised. The most common defenses
include contributory negligence or comparative fault, depending on
the statutes that exist in the state.20 ' The defense can also raise
statutes of limitations, which govern products liability claims.20 s






205. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 1923-24.
206. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2010) (concerning implied warranties, merchantability,
usage of trade); U.C.C. § 2-315 (2010) (concerning implied warranties, fitness for
particular purpose).
207. EPSTEIN, supra note 76, at 119; MARSHALL S. SHAPO, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TORT
LAw 127, 136-37 (1999).
208. Stearns, supra note 181 ("If the injured person is a minor the clock does not
start to run on the limitations period until she turns eighteen years old.").
209. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D, § 47:64 (2012). The theory behind
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IV. FOODBORNE ILLNESS LITIGATION: EMPIRICAL MODEL
Previous parts examined the benefits and shortcomings of
deterring foodborne illness through indirect regulation (legal
liability) and direct regulation (local, state and federal, FDA
rules). According to theory, when a plaintiff wins a large tort
verdict or settlement, the monetary damage will send a strong
signal (as a litigation-related cost) to the firm to increase food
safety protections and deter firms from producing unsafe food
in the future. However, to test whether tort verdicts are
deterring in this way, we need to know how often plaintiffs win
and how much they recover. For this, we need to examine
actual tort verdicts and settlements.
This section analyzes 320 cases filed between 2000 and
2011 that were settled or tried before juries in order to test
established theories on how and when legal liability serves as
an effective deterrent. A working hypothesis developed from
the theory is that a tort verdict or settlement has deterrence
value when a plaintiff wins and when the monetary verdict is
large. Using this, I establish two empirical models to examine
factors that contribute to a plaintiffs win and to the size of the
verdict, respectively. I also establish a model to examine
factors contributing to the speed at which a case is resolved.
The empirical results will inform the solution for improved
(and empirically informed) federal regulation presented in
Part V. As a preview, I use the empirical results to match the
ways in which tort liability is or is not serving as a deterrent
with what we know about the deterrence value of regulations.
Knowing when legal liability falls short of serving as a
deterrent is also useful in determining when and how
regulation should correct this market failure by making
improvements to the federal FSMA regulations.
The following paragraphs describe the methodology for
collecting the case data, introduce summary statistics, submit
the data to empirical logistic regression analysis, and present
quantitative results.
A. Methodology for Collecting Case Data
A dataset of state and federal cases involving foodborne
illness was collected to examine the amount plaintiffs received,
federal preemption is that, where a federal statute or regulation occupies an entire field of
law, and subjects it to extensive regulation, there is no room left for state law to operate
within that field. See, e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
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when plaintiffs won, and the rate at which cases were resolved
from 2000 to 2011. The collection of the data involved three
key steps, the first of which was the collection of a set of case
data for this time period. After cases were read and entered
into the database, they were submitted to different tests of
robustness for consistency and completeness leading to a final
dataset of 320 cases. The final step involved collection of other
factors for the dataset.
The case data was originally derived using search terms for
products liability, strict liability, negligence, and contaminated food
between January 1, 2000, and January 1, 2011.210 Certain pathogen
names were used for additional searches based on a list of top
bacterial pathogens and viruses related to foodborne illness
outbreaks.' Accordingly, searches were conducted with the terms:
food poisoning, Salmonella, hepatitis-A, norovirus, bacteria and
food, and sick and hospitalized and food.212 These additional cases
were added to the dataset for a total of 320 cases for the time
period. Over half of the cases represented a "win" for the defense;
these cases were identified as cases noting that zero dollars in
damages were awarded to the plaintiff.
210. The search on Westlaw Combined Jury Verdicts and Settlements database (JV-
ALL) was ("product liability" "strict liability" negligence) & ((contaminated tainted coli
listeria norovirus salmonell! "for human consumption" "food poisoning" virus) & (eating
eaten ingest! bite! ate consumed consuming)) & DA(AFT 12/31/1999). The search returned
132 results total, and after omitting 19 noncontamination-related results, 113 cases were
entered into the database. Next for robustness sake, we added the additional search term
"food poisoning." This search yielded 112 results, and after omitting for duplications and
for non-food contamination cases, an additional 17 cases were added to the spreadsheet.
Finally, we conducted a search for individual pathogens. Many cases appeared, but most
were duplicates already in the spreadsheet, or medical cases unrelated to food
contamination. The results were as follows: "Listeria:" 2 cases total, both already in
spreadsheet. "Salmonella:" 12 cases total, all already in spreadsheet. "E.Coli:" 24 cases
total, 9 repeat, 12 medical unrelated, 3 other unrelated. "Vibrio:" 0 cases.
"Staphylococcus:" 19 cases total, 18 medical unrelated, 1 other unrelated (tattoo).
"Campylobacter:" 0 cases. "Toxoplasma:" 0 cases "Botulism:" 1 case total, 1 case already in
spreadsheet. "Clostridium botulinum:" 3 cases total, 3 medical unrelated "B.Cereus:" 0
cases. "Hepatitis A:" 16 total cases, 2 new cases, 6 already in spreadsheet, 7 medical
unrelated, 1 other unrelated. "Listerosis:" 0 cases. "Gastroenteritis:" 24 cases total, 5
already in database, 16 medical unrelated, 3 other unrelated. "Norovirus:" 0 cases. The
JV-ALL database is available at http://www.westlaw.com.
211. The Center for Science in the Public Interest conducted a 10-year study in
which they found that "the most frequently identified and reported bacterial pathogens
were Salmonella spp. . . . , Clostridium spp. . . . , Staphylococcus spp.," Bacillus spp., E.
coli spp., and Campylocater. Viruses were also noted-norovirus in particular accounted
for a significant number of outbreaks. See CTR. FOR SC. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, supra note
160, at 8.
212. The exact search terms on JV-ALL were: "food poisoning", salmonel!, hepatitis-
A, norovirus, bacteria and food, and (sick ill hospitalized) & food. The JV-ALL database is
available at http://www.westlaw.com.
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Key pieces of information on the case were collected: case
name, date, jurisdiction (state), citation, a summary of the
facts, plaintiff name, defendant name and type of defendant
(manufacturer, distributor, and restaurant), the likely
pathogen, time to resolve the dispute, whether or not the case
was tried at the state or federal level, damages, cause of
action, plaintiffs attorney, the age of the plaintiff, plaintiffs
death, defendant headquarters (state), the type of defendant,
defendant's attorney, and whether the plaintiffs or
defendant's attorney was an expert in the field and/or ranked,
and other variables. *
While the cases collected for this study represent all cases
related to foodborne illness found in the Westlaw database, a
few limitations to this data need to be disclosed. The cases in
this study do not represent the universe of cases on foodborne
illness. Cases make it into Westlaw by reporters and cases
213. Key facts regarding the variables include the following. Whether or not the case
was tried at a state court or federal court was recorded (state court=1, federal court-0).
We collected the damages amount for every case. When the damages are $0, the verdict,
settlement, or mediation ruled on behalf of the defendant. In the dataset, the damages
term is a positive, continuous variable. The case summaries do not provide a breakdown
of the damages. However, foodborne illness cases (and personal injury cases generally)
typically request compensatory damages (economic damages and general, or noneconomic
damages). Economic damages are those for which money has been, or will be, paid, and
for which money has been, or will be, lost, e.g., medical bills (both past and future), lost
wages (both past and future), lost earning capacity, and property damages. While past
economic damages are typically not disputed, noneconomic damages are always in
dispute. See Shapo, supra note 207, at 339-40, 349, 356. These damages include such
things as: (1) pain and suffering; (2) mental anguish and emotional distress; (3) loss of
enjoyment of life; and (4) the reasonable fear of future illness. General damages also
include loss of consortium claims, i.e., a claim asserted by the spouse or child of the
injured person alleging injury to their relationship and the loss of love and affection.
Punitive damages are controversial, but also relatively rare. Id. at 363-64. We collected
information on the plaintiff and defendant. On behalf of the plaintiff we collected:
plaintiffs name, name of plaintiffs attorney, and the age of the plaintiff. To capture
severity of the plaintiffs injury we coded for death (death=1, no death=0). On behalf of the
defendant we collected: defendant name, defendant headquarters (state), the type of
defendant (Restaurant=3, Manufacturer-1, Distributor=2), and name of defendant's
attorney. Information on the likely pathogen was collected: the pathogen (E.coli, etc.) and
if available, the type of food product (in the literature it is called the "vehicle"). To capture
if we felt there was an internationally sourced food product involved in the case, we coded
for international (Yes=Y, No=N, Unsure=U). Finally, case resolution information was
collected: type of resolution (verdict=3, settlement=2, arbitration=1), damages amount,
time to resolution (in years and months) and filing to trial (in months) based on dates
provided in the summary. Based on the fact pattern we were able to collect information on
the cause of action for a given case. We coded for cause of action (Negligence=1, Products
Liability=2, Negligence plus Products Liability=3, Other=4 (breach of warranty)). Most of
the cases in the dataset stated the case was being brought in negligence or products
liability with many stating both causes of action. The cause of action is either Negligence
(coded =1), Products liability (coded=2), Products Liability and Negligence (coded=3), or
other (coded=4). We coded for awarded damages in dollars.
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need to be filed to get into the reporters. Yet not all foodborne
illness cases are reported and not all foodborne illness cases
result in a filing because many are settled out of court. So, for
starters, the number going to Westlaw may be small. The
number may be even smaller due to variations in state
reporting mechanisms.
The dataset was tested for consistency and completeness
in order to discern whether the original search missed any
relevant cases. For instance, we discovered early on that many
cases confidentially settle prior to filing and we examined this
in depth. A confidential settlement could mean that the case
would never be recorded in the Westlaw database or in a court
reporter and would mean that the number of reported cases in
this study underrepresents the number of cases that are
settled per year.214 After analyzing the number of confidential
settlements that the most prominent foodborne illness
attorney in the United States litigates, we conclude that our
dataset of reported cases is smaller than the number of cases
during this period, but not alarmingly so.
We also wanted to check that our dataset contained cases
related to the top ten outbreaks during this time period."' The
result was a series of lists: CDC Top Ten Based on Illnesses,"
214. To gather a sense for the number of cases that potentially settle before filing-
what we call the "Marler Clark effect"--we collected the cases and press releases that the
law firm Marler Clark reveals on its website for the time period in question, 2000-2011.
Since 1993, the Marler Clark attorneys have represented thousands of clients in
litigation against restaurants and food companies whose food was identified as
the source of illness. Since that time, the law firm has represented victims of a
great many E. coli, Salmonella, hepatitis-A, or other foodborne illness outbreak
across the country.
MARLERCLARK, http://www.marlerclark.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). We counted 305
cases and/or press releases from the Marler Clark website, many of which were labeled
"confidential" or "undisclosed". Case News: Food Poisoning Cases & Other Law Firm
News, MARLERCLARK, http://www.marlerclark.com/case_news/C88 (last visited Sept. 4,
2012); Press Releases, MARLERCLARK, http://www.marlerclark.com/pressreleases/
C89/2011. This finding suggests that our dataset of reported cases is smaller than the
number of cases during this period.
215. Using the CDC Foodborne Outbreak Online Database, a search was conducted
for all states, all locations, all etiologies (the cause or origination), confirmed etiological
statuses, and the years of 2000 to the last year in the CDC database, 2008. The outbreaks
with the ten highest amounts of illnesses were compiled along with all the information
included in its CDC entry. The CDC Foodborne Outbreak Online Database is available at
http://wwwn.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/.
216. CDC Top Ten Based on Number of Illnesses during 2000-2011: (Date of
Outbreak and Number of Illnesses in parentheses): May 2006 (1644), Apr. 2008 (1500),
Apr. 2006 (1200), Jan. 2003 (964), Sept. 2002 (950), June 1998 (916), May 2001 (886), Nov.
2003 (880), Apr. 2005 (872), and Jan. 2001 (811). For more information, see the CDC
Foodborne Outbreak Online Database, supra note 215.
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CDC Top by Hospitalizations,2 17 and CDC Top Ten Based on
Deaths."' Of the top ten outbreaks for illnesses,
hospitalizations, and deaths, only two, the outbreaks with the
third and fourth highest death totals, were confirmed to be in
our database of cases. It is possible and likely that many of the
cases we are missing were confidentially settled. Again, we
conclude that our dataset of reported cases is smaller than the
number of cases during this period, but not alarmingly so.' To
be sure, future work is needed to examine confidential
settlements.
For the empirical analysis, we need to be able to capture
state differences relevant to the analyses at hand such as
differences in tort reform22 0 and differences in their public
health reporting ability (including collaboration with national
food safety initiatives and agencies).2 21 States also vary to the
217. CDC Top Ten Based on Number of Hospitalizations during 2000-2011: (Date of
Outbreak and Number of Hospitalizations in parentheses) Apr. 2008 (308), Sept. 2008
(166), Aug. 2006 (129), July 2004 (129), Oct. 2003 (128), Feb. 2007 (108), Aug. 2006 (103),
Oct. 1998 (101), Aug. 2008 (71), and Mar. 1998 (60). For more information, see the CDC
Foodborne Outbreak Online Database, supra note 215.
218. CDC Top Ten Based on Number of Deaths during 2000-2011: (Date of Outbreak
and Number of Deaths in parentheses) Oct. 1998 (21), Sept. 2008 (9), July 2002 (8), May
2000 (7), Jan. 2003 (7), Feb. 2004 (6), Aug. 2006 (5), Jan. 2010 (5), Nov. 2001 (4), Oct. 2003
(3), June 2007 (3), and Aug. 2008 (3). For more information, see the CDC Foodborne
Outbreak Online Database, supra note 215.
219. At the same time, many of the CDC outbreaks could not be confirmed because
the entry for the outbreak was often missing an important piece of information, such as
the vehicle. In addition, the summary of the facts from the cases in our database was
often missing the vehicle, the date of the incident, and the etiology. Without these three
pieces of information, it was not possible to confidently confirm a match. For more
information, see the CDC Foodborne Outbreak Online Database, supra note 215.
220. Since not every state allows a plaintiff to collect punitive damages for foodborne
illness, we needed to incorporate limits to noneconomic and punitive damages for cases
other than medical malpractice for each state. Data on damage limits was supplemented
by information from the American Tort Reform Association's summaries of the states'
recent reforms of noneconomic and punitive damages limits. AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N,
TORT REFORM RECORD 19, 34 (June 28, 2012), www.atra.org/sites/default/
files/documents/record%207-1-12_0.pdf. For both types of damages, a "0" signifies that
there is no limit, a "1" indicates that there is a limit or a higher standard of evidence, and
a "2" means that the state has declared the limits unconstitutional. Other information
was collected such as the year of the most recent statute or change to the states stance
towards damages, the citation of the statute, as well as full and concise statements of the
damage limit taken directly from the sources. LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN & HOVANNES
ABRAMYAN, U.S. TORT LIABILITY INDEX: 2010 REPORT, available at
http://www.doh.state.fl.us/Workforce/Workforce/CouncilMaterials/TortLiability_Index_2
010.pdf.
221. Two variables were collected measuring the degree to which states report and
investigate foodborne illness cases were collected: (1) the state grade in their reporting
ability (available through Citizens for Science in the Public Interest state gradings), CTR
FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, supra note 160, at 2-3; and (2) collaboration with the
FDA. The FDA participates in the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network
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extent that plaintiffs are allowed to use consumer protection
statutes to file civil suits for foodborne illness."' These
statutes are available as a means for recovery in only a
handful of states.*
In sum, the 320 cases collected for this study represent all
cases related to foodborne illness found in the Westlaw
database. Undoubtedly, the cases in this study do not
represent the universe of cases on foodborne illness because
not all foodborne illness cases are reported (for every one case
there are 30 that go unreported),2 2 4 and not all foodborne
illness cases result in a filing because many are settled out of
court. So the number going to Westlaw will be small.
B. Descriptive Statistics
Several descriptive statistics were tabulated: (1) the type
of defendants; (2) the type of resolution; and (3) the time to
resolution.
(FoodNet), a surveillance network established in 1995 which focuses on sporadic
foodborne illness as a partner in collaboration with CDC, USDA, and ten state health
departments: Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon,
Tennessee, and sections of California, Colorado, and New York. Foodborne Diseases Active
Surveillance Network (FoodNet): About FoodNet, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/foodnettabout.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2012). The
purpose of FoodNet is to:
Determine the burden of foodborne illness in the United States ... Monitor
trends in the burden of specific foodborne illness over time . .. Attribute the
burden of foodborne illness to specific foods and settings ... [And to]
[disseminate information that can lead to improvements in public health
practice and the development of interventions to reduce the burden of foodborne
illness.
Id.
FoodNet provides stable surveillance for a variety of pathogens and syndromes,
data for updating the overall burden estimate, and mechanism for rapid institution of
surveillance of new and emerging enteric pathogens. FoodNet Surveillance, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet/surveillance.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2013). FoodNet has provided documentation to support FDA regulations
by publishing over fifty-five manuscripts in the peer reviewed medical literature. About
FoodNet, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/foodnetlabout.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2012).
222. TORT LAW DESK REFERENCE: A FIFTY STATE COMPENDIUM 115, 735, 1018
(Morton F. Daller ed., 2011).
223. Id. The Tort Law Desk Reference cites each state's consumer protection statute
and was used for some of the information about damages. The URL for each state is
provided along with the amount of illegal practices listed in the statute. The names of the
statutes vary-for instance, Colorado has the "Consumer Protection Act" and New York
has the "Consumer Protection From Deceptive Acts and Practices." A review of all states'
online consumer protection statutes revealed that Wisconsin was the only state for which
the statute could not include food as a protected product.
224. Interview with Elaine Scallan, Assistant Professor of Epidemiology, Colorado
School of Public Health, in Boulder, Colo. (Oct. 1, 2011).
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The 320 defendants in the dataset were comprised of 44
distributers, 45 manufacturers, and 231 retail outlets or
restaurants. The average monetary damage amount for a case
involving a restaurant was $328,486 with a minimum of $0
and a maximum of $25.2 million. This number was somewhat
skewed however, because of a class action lawsuit which
settled for over $25 million.22 5 Of these 251 cases against
restaurants, 160 cases (or 67% of the total) were resolved by
jury verdict, 58 (25%) were settled, and 14 (6%) were resolved
through arbitration.
The average resolution for cases involving distributers
was $343,999 with a minimum of $0 and a maximum of $4.75
million. Of the 44 cases against distributors, 29 cases (or 66%
of the total) went to trial and reached a jury verdict, 12 (27%)
were settled, and 3 (7%) went to arbitration.
The average resolution for cases involving manufacturers
was $284,394 with a minimum of $0 and a maximum of $3
million. Of the 45 cases against manufacturers, 16 (or 36% of
the total) went to trial and reached a jury verdict, 21 (48%)
were settled, and 7 cases (16%) were resolved through
arbitration. Interestingly, 88% of cases against manufacturers
resulted in monetary damages awarded to the plaintiff, as
opposed to 59% of cases against distributers and 61% of cases
against restaurants.
Turning to the type of resolution, of the 320 cases, 24
ended through arbitration, 91 were settled, and 205 resulted in
jury verdicts. Of the 24 arbitration cases, 33% of the cases
resulted in $0 damages (victory for defense) and the average
damage amount (including the zeros) was $11,222 with a
minimum of $0 and a maximum of $140,000. Of the 91 settled
cases, 3% of the cases resulted in $0 damages and the average
damage award was $662,359 with a minimum of $0 and a
maximum of $13.5 million. Of the 205 verdict/trial cases, 60%
of the cases resulted in $0 damages and the average damage
amount was $211,289 with a minimum of $0 and a maximum
of $25.2 million. The jury verdict average was skewed because
of the large verdict mentioned earlier, namely a class action
award of $25 million.
225. Reno Hilton Resort Corp. v. Verderber, 106 P.3d 134, 135 (2005) (a class action
lawsuit resulting in a $25,050,000 verdict).
226. There are 133 cases for which damages were $0. These cases are present in
arbitrations, settlements, and trial verdicts. See infra Table 1.
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Table 1: Cases sorted by Arbitration, Settlement and
Verdict
Case Characteristics Arbitration Settlement Verdict
Damages = $0 8 3 122
(defense verdict)
Damages > $0 16 88 83
(plaintiff verdict)
Damages > $100,000 1 29 18
Number of 24 91 205
Observations
To summarize the descriptive results, while more cases
reach the verdict stage, the data suggest that plaintiffs fare
better when they settle-they receive higher damages. Observing
the case characteristics, of the 320 cases in the dataset, 205 reach
the verdict stage. Of these, 122 cases (59%) resulted in victories
for the defense. Plaintiffs lost their cases and received no
monetary compensation. Meanwhile, 91 cases reached the
settlement stage and only 3 (3%) plaintiffs received no monetary
compensation. Moreover, those that settled generally received
higher damages. 29 out of 91 cases that settled (32%) received
damages exceeding $100,000. For cases that reached the verdict
stage, only 18 out of 205 total verdicts (8%) received damages
exceeding $100,000.
Finally, in terms of the length of resolution, on average, it
took 3.35 years (minimum was 1 year and maximum was 14
years) for cases to be resolved from the time of the incident until
the final resolution, whether through a verdict, settlement, or
arbitration. Generally, cases that went to trial took the longest to
resolve, averaging 3.66 years before a final verdict. Cases that
were settled took 2.93 years to come to a final conclusion.
Interestingly, one settlement took 10 years to reach its final
resolution. Finally, cases that went to arbitration took 2.25 years
to resolve. Combined with earlier results that show arbitration
results in the lowest monetary sum paid per lawsuit, this
provides a strong incentive for companies facing litigation to
arbitrate.
Interestingly, the 42 cases for which "negligence" was the
designated cause of action took the longest to resolve, an average
of 3.54 years. For the 118 cases for which "products liability" was
the designated cause of action, the average was 3.39 years. For
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the 151 cases for which products liability and negligence were the
causes of action, the average was 3.21 years. And for the 29 cases
for which "other" was the designated cause of action, the average
time to resolution was 4 years.
Cases involving lawsuits against manufacturers and
restaurants took the least time to resolve (3.20 years on average,
and 3.36 years on average, respectively) compared to cases
involving lawsuits against distributors (3.43 years on average).
The average damages award was $324,557 with a minimum
of $0 and a maximum of $25.2 million. The damage award varied
with the plaintiffs age and severity of injury. If the plaintiff was
a minor, the average award climbed to $709,289, with a
minimum of $0 and a maximum of $13.5 million. If the plaintiff
died, the damages award climbed again to an average of
$1,326,926, with a minimum of $0 and a maximum of $13.5
million.
In our dataset, defendants used ranked law firms more than
plaintiffs. In the 320 cases, plaintiffs firms were ranked
nationally or locally, 10% of the time, compared to defendants
firms which were ranked 17% of the time.
C. Results
I analyzed over 300 foodborne illness cases filed between
2000 and 2011 to determine whether legal liability serves as an
effective deterrent for future wrongdoing. A working hypothesis
developed from the theory was that tort verdicts and settlements
have deterrence value when a plaintiff wins and when the
monetary verdict is large. Three empirical models are specified to
examine factors that contribute to the plaintiff win and the size
of the verdict. The "speed" model examines what determines the
speed at which a case is resolved; the "win" model examines what
determines whether or not a plaintiff wins; the "payback" model
examines what determines how much a plaintiff recovers in
monetary terms. The following paragraphs briefly describe the
results from the models specified above. Table 1 in the Appendix
contains detailed empirical results.
I developed six testable hypotheses using the descriptive
results from above. They are: (1) State Theory-state legislative
limits on damages lead plaintiffs to forum shop and recover in
some states more than others; (2) Deep Pocket Theory-some
defendants are easier to sue because they have deeper pockets
(more financial resources and/or insurance to cover claims);
(3) Elite Firm Theory-if the plaintiff/defendant is represented by
a leading law firm, then the plaintiff/defendant case is likely to
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win a greater sum;2 27 (4) Pathogen Theory-some cases may be
more severe than others due to the pathogen and some types of
pathogens are more severe than others, leading to higher
damages; (5) Strong Case Theory-plaintiffs who suffer serious
injuries and/or die have conceivably stronger cases leading to
more damages; (6) Damage Caps Theory-damages will be lower
when caps are in place. I examine the results from the empirical
models and determine whether evidence can be found in favor of
these hypotheses. The model results are as follows.
The first model is the "speed" model. I specified an ordinary
least squares (OLS) model to determine how quickly a case gets
resolved. The dependent variable, "time to resolve," is a
continuous variable measured in years. The independent
variables are: type of food consumed, year of the case, whether
the plaintiff died, the type of defendant involved, method in
which the case was resolved, whether the case was tried in state
court, whether the plaintiff/defendant hired an attorney with
previous experience litigating foodborne illness cases, cause of
action, legislative limits on noneconomic damages, legislative
limits on punitive damages, whether the plaintiffs/defendant's
firm is ranked, whether the plaintiff is a minor, and the state
ranking for foodborne illness reporting.22 9 The results from this
227. Attorney ability is likely to vary. Some attorneys may be more experienced and
therefore better able to estimate the probability that a client will win a case at trial and
the damages that will be paid, or the settlement that will be reached. Other attorneys
may be better at preparing a case, negotiating a settlement, or arguing a case at trial. The
probability of winning may depend on the ability of the attorney. Cf Cooter & Rubinfeld,
supra note 29, at 1071 (noting that the amount that plaintiffs expect to win is in part
determined by the efforts the parties devote to winning),
228. See, e.g., DANIEL A. POWERS & YU XIE, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR CATEGORICAL
DATA ANALYSIS 24 (2000).
229. The independent variables in this regression (and in the other regressions to
follow): Vehicle is the type of food consumed if identified (=1), if unknown or multiple
foods but no one identified (=0), Year of the case (0 to 11, beginning with 2000=0), Die is
whether the plaintiff died (=1) or not (=0), Def is the defendant type noted as whether a
manufacturer (=1), distributor (=2), or retailer/restaurant (=3), VSA is whether the trial
went to arbitration (=0), settlement (=2), or trial, (=3). Dstate is whether the case was
tried in a state court. PlawExpert is whether the plaintiff hired an attorney that had
previous experience with this sort of case (previous experience is noted as trying/settling 2
or more cases in our dataset), (=1) or not (=0). The same is for DlawExpert. Coa denotes
the cause of action as Negligence (=0), Products liability (=2), Products liability and
Negligence together (=3), and Other (=4), Lnonec denotes limits on noneconomic damages
noted as limits (=1) and no limits (=0), Lpun denotes limits on punitive damages noted as
limits (=1) and no limits (=0). PFirmRank is whether the firm is ranked, either locally or
nationally and it is noted as ranked (=1) and not ranked (=0); the same is true for the
variable DfirmRank. Minor denotes whether the plaintiff is under 18 years of age and is
noted as minor (=1) or not minor (=0). Stategrade looks at the state ranking for food safety




model suggest that lawsuits are resolved at a slower pace when
years go by, when the case involves a plaintiff who has suffered
the gravest injury. Lawsuits are resolved at a faster pace when
the plaintiffs lawyer is an expert in litigating foodborne illness
cases and locally or nationally ranked, when the defendant's
lawyer is ranked, and when the state has limits on punitive
damages. These are all statistically significant results.
The next model is the "win" model. This model examines
what factors determine whether a plaintiff wins in terms of
receiving a monetary damage amount. If the plaintiff files a
lawsuit, the plaintiff may be compensated at the end of the trial
through a verdict or during the trial as a settlement. For our
purposes, a plaintiff either wins a case or does not win a case
(nonzero damages represents a plaintiff verdict and zero
damages represents a defense verdict). Since the dependent
variable is dichotomous, I use logistic regression (LOGIT).230 The
independent variables are the same as those listed above for the
"speed" model. The results suggest that a plaintiff is less likely to
win a monetary award if the case goes to verdict, and more likely
to win if punitive damage limits are in place and if the plaintiff is
a minor. These are all statistically significant results.
The final model, the "payback" model, examines what
factors determine the dollar amount that a plaintiff recovers.
Since the dependent variable is the "monetary damages
amount"-a continuous variable measured in dollars-an OLS
model is specified. The independent variables are the same as in
the previous models. The results suggest that the longer a suit
takes to get resolved, the higher the damages. Damages increase
when a plaintiff dies, when the state in which the illness
occurred has a higher (better) grade for public health reporting,
when the state has a limit on punitive damages, and when the
plaintiffs firm is ranked. These are all statistically significant
results.
The statistical regression results provide evidence
supporting three of the six hypotheses. First, the Elite Firm
Theory holds that if the plaintiff/defendant is represented by a
leading firm then the plaintiff/defendant case is more likely to
win a greater monetary sum. The "payback" and "speed" models
show that when a plaintiff hires an elite firm, the case is resolved
at a faster rate and with a higher level of damages. Next, the
Strong Case Theory holds that plaintiffs that suffer serious
injuries and/or die have stronger cases leading to more damages.
230. See, e.g., POWERS & XIE, supra note 228, at 49-50.
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The "payback" and "speed" models show that if a plaintiff dies,
the case will take longer to resolve but the award will be higher
than most. Finally, the Damage Caps Theory states that damages
will be lower when caps are in place. When punitive damages
limits are in place, cases are resolved faster, more plaintiffs win
(perhaps because there are fewer issues to resolve); however,
plaintiffs receive more in damages, not less. Perhaps when
plaintiffs are barred from claiming punitive damages they make
a stronger case for higher compensatory damages--evidence
supporting a substitution of compensatory damages for punitive
damages.
V. A SOLUTION FOR IMPROVED FOOD SAFETY REGULATION
The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) was introduced
during a low in the modern era of food safety regulation when the
public was crying for more regulations."' The current delay in
implementing the FSMA makes this an opportune time for policy
recommendations.
The emprical results from the analysis of 320 foodborne
illness cases provide guidance for regulators-particularly in the
areas of prevention and response. The case analysis provides
support for empirically founded regulatory improvements. Note
that many of the suggestions articulated below merely support
current efforts and do not require any new regulations per se.
This bodes well for both camps-those who disfavor more
regulation and those who support the new FS1A rules.232
231. See How Do You Fix Our Ailing Food Safety System?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 1 (2009)
(statement of Caroline Smith DeWaal, Director of Food Safety, Center for Science in
Public Interest) (decrying "long-standing deficiencies that are causing a crisis in consumer
confidence"); The Salmonella Outbreak: The Role of Industry in Protecting the Nation's
Food Supply: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong (2009) (statement of A. D. David Mackay,
CEO, Kellogg Co.) (addressing Kellogg's role in the PCA peanuts Salmonella outbreak,
and arguing that the "recent outbreak illustrated that the U.S. food safety system must
be strengthened"); Ben Feller, White House: Stricter Food Safety Rules Coming,
FOXNEWS.COM, (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendly-wires/
2009Jan30/O,4675,ObamaSalmonella,00.htm1 (noting promises of "stricter oversight" and
a "stricter regulatory structure" in response to PCA salmonella outbreak).
232. See Doug Powell, Five Years After E. Coli Outbreak, Salinas Valley Farmers
Struggle to Rebound, BARFBLOG (Nov. 27, 2011, 12:18 AM), http://bites.ksu.edu/
blog/151633/11/11/ 2 7/five-years-after-e-coli-outbreak-salinas-valley-farners-struggle-
rebound.
"It was just more regulations. More inspections. More paperwork. More filings.
More fees," said Chris Bunn, part of a four-generation Salinas Valley farming
family of California lettuce and spinach. Now in his 60s, he quit two years after
the 2006 outbreak. "I miss it terribly," Bunn said. "It was a wonderful business."
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A. Toward More Responsive, Empirically Informed Regulation
The balance between regulation and deregulation is a
delicate one and it involves many of the elements of "new
governance" listed earlier. My empirically based solution involves
more "responsive" regulation-namely, that federal regulators
will base their decision to regulate upon the conduct of the
entities that they oversee (in this case, lawsuits regarding these
entities)."' Firms can also be proactive. If firms are able to
attribute the benefits of innovation, legal liability can also spur
food safety innovation as firms recognize the costs related to
litigation. If, for example, citizens or corporations are effectively
regulating themselves, then law enforcers will be less likely to
escalate intervention.23 4 Governments will escalate to somewhat
more punitive approaches only when dialogue fails and when the
more modest forms of punishment fail. Applying this to food
safety, regulation should be responsive to market forces and
litigation outcomes, being mindful that there are no guarantees
that government intervention will improve upon the unregulated
market."' The balance, then, between regulation and
deregulation is a delicate one.
The FSMA rules and any improvements to them should be
responsive to the failures in obtaining legal redress for foodborne
illness and in government regulation of food manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers noted in the literature review, the
descriptive review of cases, and the empirical analysis.
The empirical results suggested that there are market
failures in the provision of legal redress for foodborne illness.
One such market failure is market access-the data suggests
that cases rarely go to trial. For cases that do go to trial, our data
suggests that defendants utilize ranked law firms more than
plaintiffs: plaintiffs firms were ranked 10% of the time, compared
to defendants firms which were ranked 17% of the time. This
Id.
For the opposite view, see David Acheson, FSMA Delay Spurs Curious Partnerships
and Regulation Pleas ... But They Are Likely to Have Zero Impact, LEAVITT PARTNERS,
(Sept. 6, 2012), http://leavittpartnersblog.com/2012109/fsma-delay-spurs-curious-
partnerships-and-regulation-pleas-but-they-are-likely-to-have-zero-impact/ (noting the
strong alliance between different interest groups toward more, not less, regulation).
233. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 113, at 29; see also John Braithwaite,
Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies, 34 WoRLD DEV. 884, 884-86 (2006);
John Braithwaite, Rewards and Regulation, 29 J.L. Soc'Y 12, 14, 19 (2002).
234. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 113, at 29.
235. John M. Antle, Benefits and Costs of Food Safety Regulation, 24 FOOD POL'Y
605, 606 (1999) (outlining the concepts and methods that can be used to quantify the
benefits and costs of food safety regulations).
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suggests that plaintiffs may not be receiving the best
representation possibly because plaintiffs face transaction costs
and information costs that prevent them from bringing cases
forward. Even when plaintiffs bring their cases forward,
causation is difficult to establish due to the fact that plaintiffs
seldom have in their posession the food article that made them
ill. Instead, their attorneys have to use inspection history of the
firm in question and other devices to prove causation and name
the pathogen. The empirical findings (from the "payback" model)
also suggest that plaintiffs fare better with respect to receiving
higher monetary damages in states that have favorable state
rankings for food safety preparedness. It could be that in these
states, more resources are devoted to incident reporting and
investigation leading to more evidence for the plaintiff to use in
her case. If legal remedies motivate firms to take food safety
precautions, it is only when plaintiffs come forward and win-
which means naming the pathogen. When firms bear the costs of
injuries through monetary verdicts, they are more likely to invest
more resources in reducing contamination (assuming that firms
can reap the benefits of food safety innovation).
With these results in mind, can the FSMA help plaintiffs
increase their access to the legal system and once there, to
improve their efforts in proving causation and increasing their
recovery-if and when their cases merit recovery? There are in
fact ways in which the FSMA rules show promise in correcting
some of the market failures in food safety and ways in which the
FSMA regulations could be improved. The FDA regulations can
aid plaintiffs in overcoming the main hurdles in their case-
causation and traceability-by focusing federal resources on
prevention (increasing inspections and sanctions) and
response (coordinating efforts between federal and state public
health reporting). Each will be discussed in turn.
1. Increased Prevention Efforts. When it comes to
preventive efforts, one recommendation is to increase the
visibility and responsibility of food inspections (hiring more
inspectors). The literature review highlighted cases where
regulation had failed through poor inspection. The empirical
results show that of the 320 cases, most involved restuarants as
the defendant. In a study performed by the Center for Science in
the Public Interest, foodborne illness outbreaks were found to
most commonly occur in restaurants and other food
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establishments, followed by private homes, and workplaces."'
Restaurants are implicated as the primary source for outbreaks
due to the fact that restaurants handle a high quantity of food
and use a variety of preparation methods leaving plenty of
opportunity for contamination.2 37
A recent investigation in Dallas found that over 200 Dallas
restaurants had not received an inspection in at least two
years."3 One restaurant industry expert noted that the Dallas
findings are typical of big cities around the country where cities
cut back on inspectors and are unable to maintain inspection
workloads.' Evidence of this is found in a recent article showing
that "two years ago, Dallas had 23 restaurant inspectors," but
after inspectors left and were not rehired "[tloday Dallas has 13
inspectors to inspect more than 6,000 restaurants."24
Local and state regulators are not the only ones to blame-
the FDA has also been faulted for state inspections.' What the
FDA can do is to ensure that states have completed the number
of inspections assigned to them and to monitor the inspections as
required by law. 42 The current practice is for federal regulators
to delegate the inspection of plants that pack and process food to
the states-yet federal regulators are failing to monitor state
inspections.24 Evidence shows that this delegation of oversight,
fueled by a lack of federal resources, is widespread.'" Over one-
half of FDA inspections were conducted by state officials in fiscal
2009, up from 42% in 2005.4 Inspections that are not conducted
properly can expose consumers to life-threatening foodborne
illness.
236. CTR. FOR SCL IN THE PUB. INTEREST, supra note 160, at 9.
237. Id.
238. Scott Friedman, NBC 5 Investigation: Hundreds of Dallas Restaurants
Not Inspected in Years, NBCDFW.Com (Apr. 27, 2012, 1:58 AM), http://www.nbcdfw.
com/news/health/NBC-5-Investigation-Hundreds-of-Dallas-Restaurants-Not-Inspected-in-
Years-140572833.html; see Dallas City Code 17-10.2(f)(4) (requiring inspections every 6
months at a minimum).
239. Friedman, supra note 238 (referencing a conversation with food safety expert
Peter Snyder).
240. Id.





245. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUmAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
vULNERABILITIES IN FDA's OVERSIGHT OF STATE FOOD FACILITY INSPECTIONS 14 (2011),




As mentioned earlier in connection with the discussion on
deterrence and the role of raids, the Salmonella outbreak
connected to peanuts processed in a Georgia plant occurred after
the plant had passed multiple inspections by state officials
working on the FDA's behalf. In that same year, the FDA was
reportedly working with forty-one states, "eight [of which] did not
complete 10 percent of the 2,170 inspections they were
responsible for that year."" To be sure, improvements in food
safety will not come from increasing state inspections alone; it is
critical that FDA regulators increase their oversight of state
inspections, implementing state recommendations when needed.
It has been noted that the FSMA mandate to increase the
frequency of inspections both in the United States and abroad
will be costly and that the cost will be a challenge. 247 Building
partnerships will provide the FDA an ability to meet this
frequency with limited funding. For instance, FS1A section 209
provides the FDA with the authority to provide grants to state,
local, tribal, and territorial partners."' These partnerships will
help the FDA to achieve the increased frequency of inspections.
FSMA section 307 allows the FDA to accredit third parties for
certification, and section 306 provides the FDA with the
authority to create agreements with foreign governments for
FDA inspections in those countries.24 9 It also provides the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) with
the authority to inspect seafood facilities abroad. All of these
various partnerships will enable the FDA to increase its capacity
for inspections. It is also important for the FDA to engage in risk
analysis. The FDA should prioritize its more limited resources on
the riskiest areas. In its inspections, the FDA should rely on its
partner agencies to inspect those facilities and products with a
lower risk; and it will focus its own resources on the highest risk
inspections. A determination of the level of risk will depend on:
(1) the inherent risk of the food product; (2) inherent risks in the
food processing; (3) the facility's compliance history; and (4) food
246. ElBoghdady, supra note 241.
247. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE FOR FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT
4, 6, 10 (2010), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/ll7xx/
doc117941s510.pdf; FSMA Implementation: Prioritizing Partnerships and Risk, LEAVITT
PARTNERS (2012), http://leavittpartners.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Food-Safety-
Website-FSMA-Implementation-Scorecard-v4-1.20.12.pdf.
248. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 209, 124 Stat. 3885,
3945 (2011) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 399c); Leavitt Partners, supra note 247.
249. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, §§ 306-307, 124 Stat.




safety programs in the country where the food was produced. The
top ten food pathogens, and the cost burden of foodborne illnesses
connected with food products, will also likely be relevant factors.
And yet, as noted earlier, while it is important for the FDA to use
its resources wisely to increase inspections, it is equally critical
to increase monitoring of inspections delegated to states and local
governments.
Since inspections are to be increased both in the United
States and abroad, it is perhaps timely to discuss to what extent
importer liability issues are at stake. What deters importers from
importing questionable foods? How many lawsuits are directed
towards importers? Analyzing the cases in the database reveals
that no cases are tied or linked to a foreign-sourced product.
While few domestic firms are held accountable, even fewer
foreign firms are held accountable for contamination of food
products. A recent report published by the FDA provides an
update on FS1VIA implementation.2 5 0 While it is not
comprehensive, it provides some of the major steps taken by
agencies to implement the FSMA.25' While none of the foods
examined in the empirical study was a foreign product, it is
important to note that the FS1VIA has increased protections for
food imports."'
For instance, in July 2011, the FDA received authority to
suspend the registration of food facilities in order to prevent
importing and exporting to the United States.253 If a food facility's
safety measures fail, that facility is expected to file a report with
the FDA and voluntarily recall the product or take other
measures to ensure the food is not sent to consumers.2 54 The FDA
may suspend a facility's registration if the food it has produced or
distributed has "a reasonable probability of causing serious
adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals."'
Furthermore, the FDA was granted the authority to detain food
products with its administrative powers for up to thirty days if it
has reason to believe they are misbranded or adulterated.2 56 The




253. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 102, 124 Stat. 3885,
3887 (2011) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 350d); see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 250.
254. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 250.
255. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 102, 124 Stat. 3885,
3887 (2011) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 350d).
256. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 207, 124 Stat. 3885,
3944 (2011) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 334); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 250.
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products are not to be sold or distributed while the agency
decides whether the products should be seized or subjected to a
federal injunction prohibiting their distribution. On May 5,
2011, the FDA issued two interim final rules. The first requires
that a person providing prior notice of imported food must
provide the name of the country where the food was refused
entry, even for animal food.258 The second provides criteria for the
administrative detention of food.259 Under this rule, the "FDA
may order administrative detention if there is reason to believe
that an article of food is misbranded or adulterated."60
Regarding food safety training and inspections, as of July 1,
2011, the FDA, the USDA, and the National Institute of Food
and Agriculture (NIFA) signed into force an agreement to create
a competitive grant program for projects such as food safety
training.' The FDA held its third public meeting on June 6,
20 11.262 In this meeting, enforcement, frequency and targeting of
facility inspections, the manner of inspections, and how to
improve the reportable food registry were discussed. 2 0
One may ask how far inspection authority should go, for
instance-is it feasible to install video monitors at food
manufacturing plants so that real-time video streaming can take
place? I caution against regulations that would make firms
fearful of liabilty such that they take the "safe" or "defensive"
route that some physicians have taken when it comes to tort
reform. Some regulations are welcome, some are not. Among the
ones that are disfavored are regulations that limit competition on
the basis of quality and safety and forestall investment and
innovation.26 4 Moreover, food producers need to be able to invest
257. Id.
258. Information Required in Prior Notice of Imported Food, 76 Fed. Reg. 25,542
(May 5, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1.281).
259. Criteria Used to Order Administrative Detention of Food for Human or Animal
Consumption, 76 Fed. Reg. 25,538 (May 5, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1.393).
260. Id. at 25,538.
261. Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Food & Drug. Admin. and the
U.S. Dep't of Agric. Research, Educ., & Econ. (July 1, 2011),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/MemorandaofUnderstandingM
OUs/DomesticMOUs/ucm261929.htm; FooD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 250.
262. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 250.
263. Minutes of Public Meeting on the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act: A Focus
on Inspections and Compliance 6-7 (June 6, 2011), http*//www.fda.gov/downloads
/Food/FoodSafety/FSMA/UCM262519.pdf; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 250.
264. The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 (and its sister provision, the Federal Meat
Inspection Act) are both as notable for handing national food companies a competitive
advantage over local and regional companies as they are for preventing state health
departments from imposing tougher safety regulations than those proposed on the federal
level. CLAYTON A. COPPIN & JACK HIGH, THE POLITICS OF PURITY: HARvEY WASHINGTON
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in safety and innovation knowing that they can reliably
appropriate the benefits of their investments. Regarding
incentives for promoting food safety technologies, on May 23,
2011, the FDA established a docket to "obtain information about
preventive controls and other practices used by facilities to
identify and address hazards associated with specific types of
food and specific processes."" The purpose of the docket was to
provide information and guidance on the best preventive
controls.266
Aside from the discussion concerning inspection authority,
another recommendation is to increase traceability standards
such that foodborne illness can be traced to particular food. This
requires imposing detailed recordkeeping requirements related to
distribution, a difficulty noted in the literature review and
empirical results."6 More often than not, a consumer is unable to
track the food item that contributed to her illness, leading to a
delay in solving the outbreak and, when a lawsuit is involved, a
lower likelihood of a settlement or plaintiff verdict at trial. A
final recommendation is to expand strict liability to other
elements on the distribution chain. In Colorado, for example,
retailers are excluded from liability."' Together, these
recommendations increase preventive tools to deter firms from
food safety violations.
2. Increased Response Efforts. In order for regulation to be
more (empirically) informed and responsive to market and legal
outcomes, regulators need to respond in a more timely fashion to
outbreaks and increase their foodborne illness detection and
protection efforts.
First, federal efforts to respond to breaches in food safety
need to be expedited. Experience has shown that industry
solutions alone are not often the best social outcomes. For
wILEY AND THE ORIGINS OF FEDERAL FOOD POLICY 6, 81-82 (4th ed. 2002) ("tBluried in
the disputes over federal regulation is a conflict between local and national food
companies. In various ways, federal regulations conferred competitive advantage on
national firms.").
265. Preventive Controls for Registered Human Food and Animal Food/Feed
Facilities; Request for Comments, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,767, 29,768 (May 23, 2011); FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., supra note 250.
266. Preventive Controls for Registered Human Food and Animal Food/Feed
Facilities; Request for Comments, 76 Fed. Reg. at 29,768.
267. Sometimes causation can be so diffiuclt that the food product consumed at a
restaurant is never found. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra
note 154 (noting the difficulty of locating the source of the contaminated peanuts in the
PCA outbreak).
268. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-402(2011).
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example, in the wake of the Dole spinach outbreak in 2006, the
industry's first response was to seek federal regulation, in hope
that by doing so, needed investments would not be cost
prohibitive."" When government regulators stalled, United Fresh
Produce Association and others "took advantage of the delay and
preempted mandatory regulation by drafting the National Leafy
Greens Marketing Agreement (LGMA)." "0
In the end, standards were set lower than regulation would
have warranted.17' "[Tihe LGIA had the effect of leveling the
playing field for the rest of the market, and so ensuring that all
would bear similar costs in meeting improved but still lower
safety requirements."7 ' The requirements were in fact "less
stringent than what would have likely resulted if market
participants [in the leafy green industry] had been forced to
compete in an open market on the basis of improved safety and
innovation."7 Suppliers compete, for example, when they sell to
distributors and retailers. It is not uncommon for large buyers to
impose requirements of fresh produce providers, "using their own
economic leverage as a means of requiring a safer product." 7
lClontractually imposed standards [are] more stringent than the
LGMA best practices," and have been termed "supermetrics"2 %
"[TIhe coordinated suppression of quality standards" was
foreseen by Nobel Prize-winning economist George Akerlof.7 1 In
his article, The Market for Lemons, he states, "there is incentive
for sellers to market poor quality merchandise, since the returns
for good quality accrue mainly to the entire group ... rather than
to the individual seller.""
Second, the level of foodborne illness detection and
protection needs to be harmonized and increased. Just as states
receive varying amounts of federal assistance for foodborne
illness response, states also vary in their effectiveness in
responding to outbreaks (see, for example, the state grading
269. See Stearns, supra note 21, at 264.
270. Id. at 264 & n.72.
271. Id. at 264.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 265.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 265 & n.4.
276. Id. at 266.
277. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970). "[1f everyone in an industry pays to
the same extent when unsafe or poor quality goods are sold, a greater profit can be made
by competing on price rather than quality, so long as the consumer cannot tell the
difference." Stearns, supra note 21, at 266.
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system). The state grading system that was used in the empirical
model highlighted one finding. The state grade was significant in
that plaintiffs from states that were more efficient in their state
reporting received higher damages. Presumably this means that
the state had a budget to perform field interviews at a faster rate
and conduct a more thorough investigation-thereby leading to
more documentation for the plaintiff to establish causation.
The FSMA establishes a framework for an integrated food
safety system.' An integrated food safety system could leverage
state and federal resources to raise the level of foodborne illness
detection and protection for consumers across the country. The
framework includes authorizing $24 million a year to assist
surveillance activities at the state level by coordinating federal,
state, and local disease reporting systems, improving tools for
identifying disease, and increasing state participation in national
networks.' The FSMA also instructs the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to develop and implement strategies for
enhancing food safety and defense capacities at the state and
local level to accelerate surveillance and outbreak investigations
and share information more rapidly with the food industry,
health care providers, and the public.2 o Resources should be
focused in these areas.
As far as coordination of efforts is concerned, the FSIA
instructs the CDC to improve the collection, analysis, reporting,
and usefulness of data on foodborne illnesses through better
coordination with states, more rapid sharing of information, and
improving food attribution in the reporting of outbreaks."' It
requires the FDA and the CDC to improve epidemiological tools
available to the states."' Within a year, the law directs the
federal government to name five state health departments as
regional Centers of Excellence to serve as resources for public
health officials in response to outbreaks."
State-based reporting is essential to identifying food and
hazard combinations and for this reason, the FSMA addresses
strengthening state-based reporting systems for outbreak
278. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
279. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 205, 124 Stat. 3885,




283. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 210, 124 Stat. 3885,
3950 (2011) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-16).
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reporting." "Solved outbreaks"-those in which the food and
hazard are identified-provide the best data available to the food
industry and regulators on what are the most important hazards
to address in food safety plans. The empirical findings show that
the disparity in reporting standards between states is significant.
This result can be used to inform regulation-notably, if FSMA is
able to provide for enhanced surveillance, this could reduce the
disparities reporting between different states and allow for better
targeting food safety inspections.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an era where many governance forces exist to regulate
firm behavior and where no particular regulation mechanism
works best, federal regulation can gain from being more
responsive (and reactive) to market forces and legal outcomes.
This Article illustrates how legal liability alone can serve as
an economic signal to deter firms from producing unsafe food and
how legal liability can also serve as an indirect regulator
promoting food safety. From the liability and deterrence
literature, legal verdicts have the power to incentivize food safety
precautions. Firms will optimize their decisions when faced with
a low cost of adopting a precaution and a high cost of a lawsuit.
However, lawsuits are not a "sure thing" as far as food safety is
concerned.
Many factors prevent plaintiffs from bringing their
foodborne illness cases forward. In an empirical examination of
all foodborn illness cases between 2000 and 2011, I highlight
relevant market failures preventing plaintiffs from recovering for
their injuries. One market failure is market access-a plaintiffs
inability to bring a case forward. A widely viewed justification for
regulation is to correct market failures. This Article shows how
an empirical examination of foodborne illness trials and
settlements can be used to fine-tune food safety regulation by
correcting market failures. For instance, improved federal
regulations could lower information costs preventing plaintiffs
from suing.
At the same time, regulations could increase the
transactions costs for firms should they violate food safety
regulations. The FSMA provides more tools (than the former
FDCA) for local, state, and federal government officials to inspect
firms and penalize wrongdoers. Faced with new federal
284. See CTR. FOR SCL IN THE PUB. INTEREST, supra note 160, at 13.
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regulations and fines, firms may opt for more food safety
precautions. While the FSMA may not need to incentivize
some firms to adopt food safety technologies (notably those
that have already adopted them or do so as part of industry
standards), the FSMA could have an effect on small and
medium-sized firms.2 85
Ultimately, making serious strides in preventing foodborne
illness requires the commitment of many relevant players:
consumers, physicians, food manufacturers, restaurants,
distributors, state and local health departments, federal food
safety agencies, Congress, and state legislatures. As newspaper
headlines report continued delays with FDA rulemaking and
funding for food safety efforts in the United States and abroad,2 8
my findings suggest that food safety requires improvement in
terms of inspections, if nothing else.
This Article contributes to the understanding and active
debate surrounding the interplay between legal liability and food
safety regulation. To date, delays with FSMA proposed rules
continue. It is quite likely that the precautionary rules will not
be adopted until the middle of 2013.28 For this reason, this is an
opportune time to consider the empirically founded
recommendations provided above.
285. Interview with Fred Martinez, FDA Retail Manager, FDA Denver Regional
Office, in Denver, Colo. (Oct. 11, 2011). See also Acheson, supra note 232 (discussing an
unlikely alliance between food safety advocates and industry in seeking FMSA regulatory
implementation). Leavitt Partners notes that the most progressive companies are already
moving with FSMA preventive control preparation (because they want to be ahead and
because FSMA preventive control requirements make sense for protecting a company's
brand). Other firms have been waiting--either because they have not wanted to take
FSMA seriously when they have to or because they simply have not seen FSMA coming.
Id.
286. See, e.g., Brady Dennis, FDA Begins Implementing Sweeping Food Safety Law,
WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2013), http://articleswashingtonpost.com/2013-01-
04/national/36209422_1_food-safety-food-bome-grocery-manufacturers-association/
2 ;
Julian Pecquet, FDA Official: GOP Amendment Could Gut Preventative Food Safety
Effort, THEHILL.COM (June 7, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/food-
safety/165087-fda-official-gop-amendment-could-gut-prevention-based-food-safety-effort.
287. See Acheson, supra note 232 ("[Gletting the rules out is merely the first step in a
very long road."). The FDA Rulemaking Process involves several steps the first of which is
to publish a notice of the proposed rule or an interim final rule. This is followed by a
period of public comment (lasting 30-120 days). 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d) (2006). The final
rule is published only after the FDA has considered any revisions based on comments
prior to publishing the final rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). Implementation of the final
rule takes up to a year for large businesses and three years for small businesses. See
Acheson, supra note 232. By my calculation, at the time of this writing, the proposed rules




This Appendix on the following page presents tabular results
for three emprical models examining the following questions:
(1) what determines the speed at which a case is resolved (the
"speed" model); (2) what determines whether or not a plaintiff
wins (the "win" model); and (3) what determines how much a
plaintiff recovers in monetary terms (the "payback" model).
Appendix. Logistic and OLS Regression Results for
Three Models
**Significant at the 1% level; *Significant at the 5% level.
Standard Errors in Parentheses
Variable
Vehicle (Food Ingested)
Year
Death Reported
Defendant Type
Verdict, Settlement,
Arbitration
Defendant's State
Plaintiffs Lawyer an
Expert
Defense Lawyer an
Expert
(1)
"Speed"
Model
(OLS
Regression)
I -
0.060
(0.18
0.107
(0.027
1.561
(0.399
-0.11
(0.118
0.649
(0.134
0.097
(0.175
-0.56
(0.305
0.267
(0.218
0)
(2)
"Win"
Model
(Logistic
Regression)
-0.103
(0.287)
-0.073
1(0.44)
-0.687
(0.684)
I U.U48
(0.205)
-1.512
L) (0.283)
0.099
)'(0.282)
3* -0.301
) (0.493)
0.080
) (0.353)
(3)
"Payback"
Model
(OLS
Regression)
0.040
(0.168)
-0.000
(0.025)
0.769*
(0.387)
-0.059
(0.110)
0.027
(0.129)
0.145
(0.165)
0.003
(0.289)
0.057
(0.217)
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Cause of Action
Limits on Noneconomic
Damages
Limits on Punitive
Damages
Plaintiffs Firm Ranked
Defendant's Firm
Ranked
Plaintiff a Minor
State Health System
Grade
Resolved in Years
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2
1.913**
(0.542)
320
I
4.849**
(1.03)
320
0.24 0.19
0.030
(0.111)
0.005
(0.219)
-0.654**
(0.152)
-0.611**
(0.275)
-0.417**
(0.223)
0.058
(0.243)
-0.035
(0.238)
-0.240
(0.183)
0.039
(0.353)
0.639*
(0.261)
0.284
(0.466)
-0.238
(0.363)
0.139**
(0.488)
-0.136
(0.381)
-0.087
(0.094)
785
-0.054
(0.107)
-0.195
(0.204)
0.252*
(0.140)
1.000**
(0.258)
0.294
(0.222)
-0.015
(0.200)
0.491*
(0.236)
0.158 **
(0.059)
3.520**
(0.506)
320
0.24 _
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